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ABSTRACT
The Cartesian Circle
(December 1976)
P® ter J * Markie, B.A., New York University
M.A., Ph.L., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Associate Professor Fred Feldman
In my dissertation, I am concerned with three
questions about an important line of reasoning that
Descartes pursues in the Meditations. In the First
Meditation he argues that he is "metaphysically uncertain"
(as he puts it) of many of his beliefs; in the Third and
F ourth Medita bion
,
he attempts to resolve this uncertainty.
He introduces the notion of clear and distinct perception
and tries to become metaphysically certain that every pro-
position he clearly and distinctly perceives is true. He
claims that once he is metaphysically certain of that fact,
his clear and distinct perception of a belief will make it
metaphysically certain for him.
The three questions that concern me are:
(1) What is Descartes' task?
(2) How does Descartes attempt his task?
(3)
.
Does Descartes accomplish his task?
I examine some recent attempts to answer these questions,
give answers of my own and defend my answers against some
objections
.
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INTRODUCTION
I shall he principally concerned in this dissertation
with three questions about an important line of reasoning
that Descartes pursues in the Meditations
. In the First
Meditation he argues that he is "metaphysically uncertain"
(as he puts it) of many of his beliefs; in the Third and
^ourth Meditation, he attempts to resolve this uncertainty.
He introduces the notion of clear and distinct perception
and tries to become metaphysically certain that every pro-
position he clearly and distinctly perceives is true. He
claims that once he is metaphysically certain of that fact,
his clear and distinct perception of a belief will make it
metaphysically certain for him.
The first question that will concern me is:
(1) What is Descartes' task?
His task seems to be that of going from one epistemic state
to another. The major feature distinguishing these states
is that in the latter he can be metaphysically certain of
propositions of which he cannot be metaphysically certain
in the former. One might say that his task is to go from
his "initial epistemic position" to the position of "epistemic
enlightenment". Yet, it is not clear how we are to under-
stand Descartes' notion of metaphysical certainty. It is
also unclear what propositions are involved here. At some
IX
points, for example, Descartes claims that until he attains
the position of epistemic enlightenment, he cannot be meta-
physically certain that he exists. 1 At another point, he
claims that even in his initial position he can be meta-
physically certain of his existence.^
The second question I shall be concerned with is:
(2) How does Descartes attempt his task?
Descartes' aim is to formulate an argument that will make
him metaphysically certain of the truth of his clear and
distinct perceptions. But he does not clearly explain why
the argument he formulates places him in the position he
desires
.
As might De expected, the third question I shall con-
sider is:
( 3 ) Does Descartes accomplish his task?
I am particularly interested in whether his attempt involves
a circular argument. Some of Descartes' critics have sus-
pected that it does. Arnauld, for one, wrote him that:
The only remaining scruple I have is an un-
certainty as to how a circular reasoning is
to be avoided in saying: The only secure
reason we have for believing that what we
The Philosophical Works of Descartes
,
transl.
Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge
:
Cambridge University Press, 1931 ), I, 159 and I85.
2 Ibid .
,
II, 38.
Xclearly and distinctly perceive is true, isthe fact that God exists. But we can saythat God exists, only because we clearly and
evidently perceive that; therefore, prior tobeing certain that God exists, we should be
certain that whatever we clearly and evidentlv
perceive is true.
3
In reply
,
Descartes claimed that Arnauld had misunderstood
him and that he had not presented a circular argument. He
did not, however, clearly state how he had been misunder-
4
stood
.
Answering these Questions does not promise to be easy.
I must find responses to them that are provided by Descartes *
epistemology when it is interpreted in the best possible
light. My answers to (1) and (2) must have strong textual
support. They must also interpret Descartes as setting an
interesting and realistic task for himself and as attempt-
ing it in a plausible manner. My response to (3) must suc-
cessfully evaluate his attempt. A good deal is to be gained
from correctly answering these questions, however. In doing
so, I will lay bare a large portion of Descartes' epistem-
ology, and come to appreciate some of its strengths and
weaknesses .
In what follows, I shall consider some recent attempts
to answer these questions and then give answers of my own.
By first considering these unsuccessful answers, I hope to
3 Ibid .
,
II, 92.
4
Ibid.
,
II, 114.
XI
demonstrate the need for a new interpretation and to narrow
down the range of alternatives to the one I present.
The first two chapters are devoted to a line of in-
terpretation that has been pursued at various times by Willis
Doney, Harry Frankfurt and Anthony Kenny. On this line of
interpretation, Descartes is regarded as maintaining that
his clear and distinct perception of a proposition always
implies his metaphysical certainty of it. He is also in-
terpreted as having a motive other than that given above
for attempting to become metaphysically certain that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true
.
Examination, however, will reveal a lack of strong
textual evidence for the claim that Descartes thinks his
clear and distinct perceptions are always metaphysically
certain. It will also reveal that any interpretation con-
taining that claim can not correctly answer my questions.
In the third and fourth chapters, I will consider
interpretations presented by Alan Gewirth, Willis Doney
and Fred Feldman. According to these commentators, Descartes
believes some propositions are such that his clear and dis-
tinct perception of them is insufficient to make them meta-
physically certain for him. However, his clearly and dis-
tinctly perceiving them and his satisfying some further
condition are sufficient to do so. Though they differ as
to the nature of this further condition, each of these
commentators takes Descartes' state of epistemic enlightenment
Xll
to be one in which he satisfies it, and
of the argument by which he attempts to
Each of them also interprets Descartes
presents a version
attain that state
.
as denying that he
becomes metaphysically certain of some of his clear and
distinct perceptions in order to do so.
My consideration of these interpretations will reveal
that they come close to answering my questions successfully.
Descartes does believe some propositions are such that to be
metaphysically certain of them he must clearly and distinctly
perceive them and satisfy some further condition. He also
believes he satisfies that condition in his state of epistemic
enlightenment. However, contrary to these interpretations,
he believes that to reach that state he becomes metaphysical-
ly certain of some propositions he clearly and distinctly
perceives
.
In chapter five, I shall present my own interpretation.
I interpret Descartes as believing that some propositions are
such that his clear and distinct perception of them is in
sufficient to make them metaphysically certain for him. I
take his task to be that of formulating a procedure by which
he can become metaphysically certain of those propositions
.
I also interpret him as maintaining that some of his clear
and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain for him
in his initial position and as employing those perceptions
in his attempt at his task. On my interpretation, Descartes'
attempt is not circular, though it may contain other faults.
xiii
I devote chapter six to answering some objections to
my interpretation and to noting some of the joints that remain
to be examined even if my answers are accepted.
CHAPTER I
In this chapter and the following one, I shall consider
three interpretations of Descartes' line of reasoning, each
of which attributes the same claim to him. This claim is
that whenever an individual clearly and distinctly perceives
a proposition, it is metaphysically certain for him. I
shall first show that each interpretation fails to answer
my questions correctly. In doing so, I shall not consider
whether they are correct in ascribing this principle to
Descartes. Once I have established that these interpreta-
tions are unsuccessful on other grounds, I will argue that
no interpretation that ascribes this principle to Descartes
can correctly answer my questions.
1. The first interpretation has been given by Willis Doney. 1
Roughly stated, his answer to (1) is as follows. Descartes'
task is to exchange his initial position for one in which he
can be metaphysically certain of any scientific truth. He
believes that, in his initial position, he can be meta-
physically certain of all and only those propositions he can
clearly and distinctly perceive or deduce from his clear
^Willis Doney, "The Cartesian Circle," Journal of the
History of Ideas, 16, 2 (June 1955). 324-338.
2and distinct perceptions. He also believes some scientific
truths do not belong to this category. He thinks that those
truths cannot be metaphysically certain for him so long as
he has doubts about the reliability of his memory and, in
his initial position, he has such doubts.
2
With regard to (2), Doney claims that Descartes at-
tempts to accomplish his task by becoming metaphysically
certain of two propositions. The first is that God exists.
The second is that God "guarantees his use of memory.
According to Doney, Descartes believes that his metaphysical
certainty of these two propositions will place him in the
epistemic position he desires. He also believes that they
are among the propositions of which he can be metaphysically
certain in his initial epistemic position.
In response to (3) Doney does not conduct a detailed
examination of Descartes' attempt to determine whether or
not it is successful. He does, however, claim that it
does not involve a circular argument.
2. Doney' s answer to (1) consists of three claims:
(4) Descartes maintains that his clear and dis-
tinct perception of a proposition or his de-
duction of it from his clear and distinct
perceptions is always sufficient to make it
metaphysically certain for him.
(5) Descartes believes there are scientific truths
2 Ibid
.
,
328.
^Ibid.
,
326 & 329.
4
Ibid
.
, 325 & 326.
( 6 )
he can never clearly and distinctly perceiver deduce from his clear and distinct per-ceptions ana that in his initial positio^he cannot be metaphysically certain of thesetruths due to his
. metaphysical uncertainty
regarding the reliability of his memory.
Understanding his initial epistemic stat*m. this way, Descartes tries to attain an
.epistemic state in which he can be meta-physically certain of any scientific truth.
To appreciate this answer fully, a number of points
have to be clarified. In presenting (4), Doney does not
fully explain the notions of clear and distinct perception,
deduction from clear and distinct perceptions and meta-
physical certainty. While the first does not need to be
clarified for my purposes, the other two require some con-
sideration
.
The notion of metaphysical certainty can be briefly
explained by reference to some of Descartes' own staxements
.
Doney, himself, seems to understand this notion on the basis
of those statements. According to Descartes, a proposition
is metaphysically certain for a person at a time if and only
if no other proposition provides him with a reason to doubt
.
c
it at that time A proposition can provide a person with
a reason to doubt another one without being metaphysically
certain for him, but it can not do so if its negation is
metaphysically certain for him.^
^Haldane and Ross, II, 266.
6 Ibid
. ,
277.
4To define deduction from clear and distinct percep-
tions, we first need to define what it is to deduce a pro-
position. It appears Doney would accept the following defin
ition:
(7) S deduces p at t-df
. S apprehends p at tas a result of apprehending the premises of anargument A which has p as its conclusion andapprehending that the conjunction of the
-pre-mises of A entails p. p
Apprehending a proposition is a necessary, hut not a suffici-
ent, condition of clearly and distinctly perceiving it, and
and individual's apprehension of a proposition does not imply
its truth or its metaphysical certainty for him. Definition
(7) should be acceptable to Doney on these terms. He inter-
prets Descartes as maintaining that an individual's deduction
of a proposition does not imply its truth or its metaphysical
7
certainty
.
In writing of an individual's deduction of a proposi-
tion, I shall at times refer to the premises of his deduction.
These are the premises of the relevant argument A, their con-
junction and the proposition that the conjunction of the
premises of A entails its conclusion.
To deduce a proposition from clear and distinct per-
ceptions is to deduce it in a rather special way. We begin
with premises we are clearly and distinctly perceiving and
construct from them an argument for the proposition that
interests us. Doney states that in such a deduction "all
7Doney, J ournal of the History of Ideas, 16
,
2
, 327
& 328 .
5the steps in the proof should be present to the mind, thus
obviating the need for memory." 8 His point seems to be that
in performing such a deduction we must apprehend every one
of its premises simultaneously with our deduction of its
conclusion
.
This suggests the definition:
(8y (i; If\ s is deducing p at t and S is clearly
ana distinctly perceiving everv premise
of his deduction of p at t, S is dedic-mg p from his clear and distinct per-
ceptions at t.
(ii) If S ^ is deducing p at t and every premise
of S s deduction is either deduced by Sfrom clear and distinct perceptions at
t or clearly and distinctly perceived by
S at t, S is deducing p from his clear
distinct perceptions at t.
( iii ) S ^ is deducing p from his clear and dis-
oinc t perceptions at t only if S satis-
fies the antecedent of (i) or of (ii)
with regard to p and t.
Clause (i) is the base case; it covers those instances where
S deduces a proposition solely from premises he is clearly
and distinctly perceiving. Clause (ii) is the inductive
case and covers those instances where S goes even further
and deduces a proposition from premises some of which he is
clearly and distinctly perceiving and the rest of which he
deduces from his clear and distinct perceptions. Finally,
(iii) asserts that the only cases of deduction from clear
and distinct perceptions are those specified by (i) or (ii).
8 Ibid
.
,
328.
6In (k), then, Doney makes the following assertion:
Descartes maintains that his clear and distinct perception
of a proposition or his deduction of it in the way defined
by (8) is always sufficient to make him metaphysically cer-
tain of it.
Doney seems to think Descartes is led to adopt this
position by his acceptance of two epistemic principles.
Doney presents the first one in his statement that according
to Descartes "clear and distinct perceptions were never
subject to doubt." 9 He appears to attribute this principle
to Descartes:
( 9 ) If S clearly and distinctly perceives p att, p is metaphysically certain for S at t
.
The second principle is that "a demonstration based on clear
and distinct perceptions could not be mistaken
. . .
This may be stated more exactly as
:
( 10 ) If S deduces p from his clear and distinct
perceptions at t, p is metaphysically cer-
tain for S at t.
Clearly, Descartes acceptance of ( 9 ) and (10) would commit
him to the position ascribed to him in (4) .
The next part of Doney' s answer is given by:
( 5 ) Descartes believes there are scientific truths
he can never clearly and distinctly perceive
or deduce from his clear and distinct percep-
tions and that in his initial position he cannot
9 Ibid
.
,
325.
1 ° Ibid .
, 327.
7be metaphysically certain of these truthsdue to his metaphysical uncertainty regard-ing the reliability of his memory.
Doney appears to understand the first part of ( 5 ) in the fol-
lowing manner . 11 Descartes limits the range of his clear
and distinct perception to some contingent prepositions
about his existence or his intellectual state and to some
very simple necessary truths. This leads him to believe
that some sciences, such as mathematics, contain truths
he can never clearly and distinctly perceive cr deduce from
his clear and distinct perceptions. Such truths are not
simple enough to be objects of his clear and distinct per-
ception. If he tried to deduce them from his clear and
distinct perceptions, his deduction would comain many pre-
mises he could not clearly and distinctly perceive
. Since
he would have to deduce each of those premises, the result-
ing deduction would be too long for him to apprehend all
of its premises at once
.
Doney understands the second part of ( 5 ) as follows.
1 "
Descartes believes there are only two ways of becoming meta-
physically certain of a proposition. The first is by clearly
and distinctly perceiving it; the second is by deducing it
from metaphysically certain permises . He thinks his deduc-
tion of a proposition from his clear and distinct perceptions
makes him metaphysically certain of it in the second of these
1
1
Ibid .
,
326
, 327 &329.
1
2
Ibid .
,
327 & 329.
8ways. He also believes that in his initial position he can-
not perform either of these operations with regard to a
scientific truth that he can neither clearly and distinctly
perceive nor deduce from his clear and distinct perceptions.
It is obvious that he cannot clearly and distinctly perceive
such a proposition. He maintains that his metaphysical un-
certainty regarding the reliability of his memory prevents
him from deducing such a proposition from metaphysically
certain premises.
To appreciate this last point, suppose p is a scienti-
fic truth Descartes cannot deduce from his clear and dis-
tinct perceptions. Descartes believes that to deduce p from
metaphysically certain premises, he must begin with pro-
positions he clearly and distinctly perceives and deduce
from them a deductive series that ends in p. He believes
he can construct such a deductive series but that, since he
cannot deduce p from his clear and distinct perceptions,
such a series is so long that by the time he apprehends p,
he no longer apprehends some of its initial premises. When
he deduces p in this way, therefore, his evidence for each
of those initial premises is either that he recollects
clearly and distinctly perceiving it or that he recollects
deducing it from his clear and distinct perceptions.
Descartes realizes that in his initial epistemic state
neither the evidence that he recollects clearly and distinct-
ly perceiving a particular premise nor the evidence that he
9recollects deducing it from his clear and distinct perceptions
is sufficient to make him metaphysically certain of that prem-
ise. When he is in that position, he is not metaphysically
certain that his recollection of such matters is correct.
For this reason, he maintains that in his initial state the
hypothesis that his memory is mistaken provides him with a
reason to doubt some of the initial premises cf his deduc-
tion 0 f p and, so, prevents him from deducing p from metaphys-
ically certain premises.
Claim (6) constitutes the last part of Doney's answer.
It says that, understanding his initial position in the way
described by (4) and (5), Descartes tries to attain a state
in which he can be metaphysically certain of ary scientific
truth. Doney's position seems to be this. The state of
epistemic enlightenment Descartes desires is a state in which
he can be metaphysically certain of even those scientific
truths he cannot clearly and distinctly perceive or deduce
from his clear and distinct perceptions. Descartes conceives
of this state as being one in which he can deduce such a
truth from metaphysically certain premises by beginning with
his clear and distinct perceptions and deriving from them a
deductive series that ends in the scientific truth. The fact
that his deduction is too long for him to apprehend all of
its premises simultaneously does not present him with any
difficulties in this new epistemic state. Unlike his initial
position, this new state in one in which his recollection of
10
clearly and distinctly perceiving a proposition or of deducing
it from his clear and distinct perceptions suffices to make
him metaphysically certain of it.
Let us now see whether this
Although Doney does not cite them,
be read in a way that supports his
answer to (1) is correct,
three passages can easily
answer. One is:
For first, we are sure that God exists because
thi^
a
fL+
tt
h
ndeG^° the proofs that establisheds act; but afterwards it is enough for us
o remember that we have perceived something
ciearly m order to be sure that it is true?but this would not suffice unless we knew thatGod existed and that He did not deceive us. 13
Descartes appears to claim that once he has become metaphys-
ically certain God exists and does not deceive him, the
evidence that he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiv-
ing a particular proposition is sufficient to make him meta-
physically certain of it. Since he regards himself as be-
coming metaphysically certain that God exists and does not
deceive him in the process of accomplishing his task, this
first passage suggests Doney' s answer.
Another passage is:
But after I have recognized that there is a God
—
because at the same time I have also recognized
that all things depend upon Him and that he
is not a deceiver, and from that have inferred that
what I clearly and distinctly perceive cannot
fail to be true--although I no longer pay any
attention to the reasons for which I have judged
this [that the angles of a triangle equal two
right angles] to be true, provided that I recol-
lect having clearly and distinctly perceived it
1 %aldane and Ross, II, 115
.
11
on,nrt
n
I
rary reason can be brought forward whichcould ever cause me to doubt its truth
.
.
.14
Descartes regards his deduction that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true as a necessary
part of his attempt to accomplish his task. This second
passage suggests, then, that he regards the accomplishment
of his task as placing him in a position where his memory
of having clearly and distinctly perceived that the angles
of a triangle equal two right angles is sufficient to make
him metaphysically certain of that fact.
In a third passage, Descartes states:
the question is raised whether we can entertainthe same firm and immutable certainty as to these
conclusions, during the time that we recollectthat they have been deduced from first principlesthat are . evident
; for this remembrance must be
assumed in order that they may be called con-
clusions.
.
My answer is that those possess it
who, in virtue of their knowledge of God, are
aware that the faculty of understanding givenby
.
Him must tend towards the truth; but that
this certainty is not shared by others . 15
Descartes
'
position seems to be that the accomplishment of
his task places him in an episteroic state in which the evi-
dence that he recollects deducing a particular proposition
from his clear and distinct perceptions is sufficient to
make him metaphysically certain of it.
Despite the support provided by these three passages,
Doney's answer is incorrect. While (4) may be granted to
him pending a discussion of whether Descartes accepts ( 9 ),
1
4
Dbid
. , 1 , 184.
1
Ibid
.
,
II, 42 & 43.
12
there are serious difficulties with (5) and (6).
According to (5), Descartes claims there are scienti-
fic truths he can never clearly and distinctly perceive
. in
fact, as it has been explained here, (5) interprets Descartes
as believing he can clearly and distinctly perceive only a
small number of scientific truths. But, there do not appear
to be any passages in which Descartes limits the range of
his clear and distinct perception this severely. Also, there
is textual evidence that strongly suggests that he does not.
In both the Principles and the Meditations
, once he has com-
pleted his task, Descartes adopts the policy of assenting to
a proposition only if he clearly and distinctly perceives it.
The relevant passage from "the Meditations is:
But, if I abstain from giving my judgement on
anything when I do not perceive it with suf-
ficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain
that I act rightly and am not deceived.
The one from the Principles is:
But, it is certain that we shall never take the
false as the true if we only give our assent to
things we perceive clearly and distinctly .1?
Given that he adopts this policy, it is very doubtful that
Descartes limits the range of his clear and distinct perception
to a few true propositions. When taken with such a limitation,
this policy would be extremely restrictive and unreasonable.
In fact, on Doney's own interpretation, it would prohibit
1
6
Ibid
. ,
I, 117.
17 Ibid
.
,
236.
13
Descartes from accepting some propositions that are meta-
physically certain for him.
Claim (6) also contains a serious difficulty. We are
seeking an answer on which Descartes sets a realistic task
for himself. But. on (6). Descartes adopts a very unrealis-
tic one. There is also, as I shall show, a passage in which
he acknowledges that he cannot accomplish the task (6) as-
signs to him.
The unrealistic nature of the task Doney sets for
Descartes may be seen by considering what he has to do to
accomplish it. Descartes must attain an epistemic state in
which he can be metaphysically certain of a proposition for
which his only evidence is either that he recollects clearly
and distinctly perceiving it or that he recollects deducing
it from his clear and distinct perceptions. It is obvious
that he cannot attain such a state. He does not have any
way of becoming metaphysically certain that his memory of
clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition
is correct. So long as he is metaphysically uncertain re-
garding this point, the evidence that he recollects clearly
and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition is in-
sufficient to make him metaphysically certain of it.
Moreover, when he is questioned about it, Descartes
seems to deny that he can accomplish this task. In the
Conversation with Burman
. Burman points out that:
But someone will declare: after I have demon-
strated the existence of God and of a God who is
14
deceives me’ wi+h +w y
’ * that my intellect
it hnt +h=i
t the rectltude God has given
J
at my memory deceives me, because Ielieve 1 remember something which in reality
ings ?§*
rememl:>eri itemory itself has its fail-
Burman's point is that even after a person has followed the
line of reasoning by which Descartes attempts his task, he
is still metaphysically uncertain of those propositions that
are evidenced solely by his memory. It is reasonable to as-
sume that these propositions include those for which his
evidence is either that he recollects clearly and distinctly
perceiving them or that he recollects deducing them from
clear and distinct perceptions
.
Descartes replies:
Concerning memory I can say nothing: it is upto each man to determine by his own personal
experience, whether or not he has a good memory.
And if he has doubts about it, he ought to make
use of notes or some other aid . 19
Descartes acknowledges Burman's point. In admitting that he
is unable to say anything concerning memory, he is acknowledg
ing that he cannot attain a state in which he is metaphysical
ly certain of propositions that are evidenced either solely
by his memory of clearly and distinctly perceiving them
or solely by his memory of deducing Ihem from clear and
1
8
Oeuvres de Descartes
, ed. Charles Adam and Paul
Tannery (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1847-1913), V, 148. This is
my translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
19 .Ibid
. ,
148. This is my translation of the passage
in Adam and Tannery.
15
distinct perceptions. Since the task Doney sets for him is
extremely unrealistic and Descartes himself admits he cannot
accomplish it, it is doubtful that he attempts it in the
Third and Fourth Meditation
.
3- Doney 's answer to my second question is initially given
by:
(11) Descartes maintains that by becoming meta-physically certain that God exists andguarantees the reliability of his memory,
he attains the epistemic state he desires.
Other than asserting that Descartes attempts to become meta-
physically certain of the proposition that God exists by
deducing it from his clear and distinct perceptions, Doney
does not provide any explanation of (11). Nor does he cite
any passages which might support it.
It seems likely, however, that Doney intends to give
the following answer to (2). Descartes tries to accomplish
his task by becoming metaphysically certain of two proposi-
tions. The first is that all his clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true
. The second is that his memory is correct
whenever he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving a
particular proposition or deducing one from his clear and
distinct perceptions. He believes he can deduce these two
propositions from his clear and distinct perceptions and,
in accordance with his acceptance of (10), he believes
his doing so will make them metaphysically certain for him.
To appreciate Descartes’ claim that his metaphysical
certainty of these two propositions places him in the
16
epistemic state he desires, consider the following example.
Descartes is metaphysically certain of these two proposition
and p is a scientific truth he can neither clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive nor deduce from his clear and distinct
perceptions. Also
. Decartes is deducing p by clearly and
distinctly perceiving some propositions and deducing from
them a deductive series that ends in p. Since he cannot
deduce p from his clear and distinct perceptions, his deduc-
tion of it is very long and he no longer apprehends some of
its initial premises. His evidence for each of these prem-
ises is either that he recollects clearly and distinctly
perceiving it or that he recollects deducing it from his
clear and distinct perceptions.
Descartes believes that, given his evidence for these
premises, there are only two hypotheses that could provide
him with a reason to doubt them. The first is that he some-
times clearly and distinctly perceives a false proposition.
The second is that he is sometimes mistaken when he recol-
lects clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular prop-
osition or deducing one from his clear and distinct percep-
tions. In this example Descartes is metaphysically certain
of the negations of these hypotheses
. Hence
,
neither of
them is able to cast metaphysical doubt on the initial
premises of his deduction. For this reason, Descartes
claims that those premises are metaphysically certain for
him and that, as a result, p is also.
17
This seems to be the most plausible version of Doney's
answer. Nevertheless, it is incorrect. We are looking for
an answer that ascribes a plausible position to Descartes
and is supported by strong textual evidence. On this answer,
Descartes is interpreted as maintaining that his memory is
correct whenever he recollects clearly and distinctly per-
ceiving a proposition or deducing one from his clear and
distinct perceptions. This claim is very implausible. It
invites the embarassing question of why Descartes' memory
is always correct with regard to these matters, when it
is obviously inaccurate with regard to other ones.
Descartes never makes this implausible claim, and
once he completes his task in the Principles
. he denies it.
frequently our memory deceives us by leading us
to believe tha u certain things have been satis-
factorily established by us. 20
For the sake of argument, we may assume with Doney that
Descartes believes he can establish a proposition by clearly
and distinctly perceiving it or deducing it from his clear
and distinct perceptions. He thus acknowledges here that
he is sometimes mistaken in his memory of having clearly
and distinctly perceived a particular proposition and in
his memory of having deduced one from his clear and distinct
perceptions
.
There does not appear to be any other way of inter-
preting Descartes' argument so that it constitutes a plaus-
20Haldane and Ross, I, 236.
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lble attempt at the task Doney sets for him. Descartes
does not draw any conclusions in his argument regarding the
reliability of memory. The major conclusions he presents
are that God exists and does not deceive him and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true. There does
not seem to be any way in which his becoming metaphysically
certain of these conclusions can be plausibly regarded as
placing him in the epistemic state he desires on Doney's
•
?iinterpretation
.
4. Doney's answer to my third question must now be consider-
ed. He does not give a detailed evaluation of Descartes'
argument, and since his answer to (2) is incorrect, he does
not provide the basis for such an evaluation. However, he
claims that Descartes' attempt is not open to Arnauld's
charge of circularity, and it is worth considering his posi-
tion on that point.
According to Doney, critics such as Arnauld have in-
terpreted Descartes in the following manner They have
ascribed to him the claims:
(12) Until he accomplishes his task, Descartes
cannot be metaphysically certain of any
proposition he clearly and distinctly
perceives
.
(13) To accomplish his task, Descartes becomes
metaphysically certain of some of his clear
and distinct perceptions.
21 Doney's answer to (2) is not open to one objection
that has been made against it. For a discussion of this
objection see the appendix.
22
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19
Understanding Descartes in this way, they have objected
that his attempt is circular. Their objection is not that
his attempt contains an argument that has its conclusion as
one of its premises. It is that, on Descartes' own position,
his attempt is successful only if he has already accomplished
his task when he makes it. By ( 13 ), his attempt is success-
ful only if he makes it in an epistemic state in which some
of his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically
certain for him. However, by (12), he is in such a state
only if he has already accomplished his task.
According to Doney
, this objection is based on a mis-
understanding of Descartes' position. Descartes does not
adopt (12). He adopts (9) with its claim that his clear
distinct perceptions are always metaphysically certain
for him.
Although the rest of Doney
' s interpretation contains
serious difficulties, this way of understanding Arnauld's
objection and of responding to it has seemed promising to
some philosophers. It is successful, however, only if we
can attribute (9) to Descartes and still answer my questions
correctly. Let us now consider another attempt to do so.
5. This attempt has been made by Harry Frankfurt. 2 -^ With
23^Harry Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,"
Descartes ; A Collection of Critical Essays
,
ed. Willis
Doney (New York: Doubleday, 1967)> 208-226 . Harry Frankfurt,
Demons
,
Dreamers and Madmen : The Defense of Reason in
Descartes * Meditations (Indianapolis & New York: Bobbs-
Merrill
,
1970Ti
2C
regard to question (1), Frankfurt state S :
Once Descartes has formulated the prinoinTe „-rclarity and distinctness, his task
mine whether or not it is ^acceptable rule
r^tiv ?? P?rceiving clearly and distinctlyIS an activity of reason. It is what the facultvOf reason does when it is at its best. The pro-blem of deciding whether clear and distinct pe?ceptions can be trusted, therefore, is the pro-blem of validating reason. 2? n 0
Frankfurt claims Descartes' task is to determine whether or
not the principle of clarity and distinctness is an accept-
able rule of evidence. He also states that Descartes' task
is that of validating reason. This suggests that he takes
Descartes' task to be that of demonstrating in some way
that the principle of clarity and distinctness is an ac-
ceptable rule of evidence
.
Frankfurt's response to' (2) is:
Descartes' way of dealing with this problem is wellknown. He demonstrates that there is a being--
God—who is both omnipotent and benign. And thenfrom the fact that God is benevolent and hence not
a deceiver, he infers that the truth of what is
clearly and distinctly perceived has a divine
guarantee . 25
According to Frankfurt, Descartes attempts to demonstrate
that the principle of clarity and distinctness is an ac-
ceptable rule of evidence by demonstrating that all his clear
and distinct perceptions are true
. He attempts to demon-
strate that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true
by demonstrating that God exists and is not a deceiver.
24
Frankfurt, Demons
, 156.
23Ibid.
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In response to ( 3 ), Frankfurt does not present a de-
tailed evaluation of Descartes' argument. However, he as-
cribes ( 9 ) to Descartes and gives a response to Arnauld
'
s
objection that is very similar to Doney's. He also goes one
step further and presents an objection of his own to Descartes.
It is that Descartes* "procedure does seem to beg the ques-
tion, although it does so in a rather different way than
has been generally thought." 2 ^
6
. Let us take a closer look at Frankfurt's answer to ( 1 ).
He interprets Descartes as wanting to demonstrate that the
principle of clarity and distinctness is an acceptable rule
of evidence. To appreciate this response, we have to deter-
mine what the principle of clarity and distinctness is, what
it is for that principle to be an acceptable rule of evidence,
and what it is to demonstrate that fact.
With regard to the first point, Frankfurt refers us
to Descartes' statement of one of his rules of method:
The first of these [rules] was to accept nothing as
true which I did not clearly recognize to be so:
that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitation
and prejudice and to include in my judgements
nothing more that what was presented to my mind
so clearly and distinctly that I could have no
occasion to doubt it. 27
Frankfurt claims Descartes is presenting a criterion or rule
26
Ibid
. , 177.
27Adam and Tannery, VI, 18.
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of evidence, and he terms this rule "the principle of clar-
ity and distinctness”. 2 ^
However, at least two different rules are suggested by
this passage. One is:
(14) Accept p at t only if you are clearly anddistinctly perceiving p in such a way thatyou are metaphysically certain of p att.
A second rule is suggested by Descartes' resolution to adopt
"nothing more than what was presented byQiii] mind so clearly
and distinctly that QigJ could have no occasion to doubt it."
(my italics.) This is the rule:
(15) If you are clearly and distinctly perceiv-
ing p in such a way that it is metaphysical-
ly certain for you at t, accept p at t
.
Frankfurt does not state which, if either, of these rules
is the principle of clarity and distinctness.
His statements suggest, however, that he takes ( 15 )
to be that principle. He states the principle of clarity
and distinctness directs him to accept propositions under
certain conditions. 29 Rule (1 5 ) satisfies this descript-
ion, but rule (14) does not. Frankfurt also claims that
Descartes is concerned with whether the principle of clarity
and distinctness might lead him to accept mutually incon-
30
sistent propositions. This is implausible if (14) is
pO
Frankfurt, Demons, 125*
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that principle. Descartes has no reason to be concerned
with whether his following (14) might lead him to adopt
mutually inconsistent propositions; (14) states a necessary
condition for accepting propositions, not a sufficient one.
Frankfurt s claim is plausible, however, if ( 15 ) is the
principle of clarity and distinctness. In so far as
Descartes follows (15), he accepts any proposition he clear
ly and distinctly perceives in such a way that it is meta-
physically certain for him. If his clearly and distinctly-
perceiving propositions in this way does not imply their
mutual consistency, his following ( 15 ) might lead him to
adopt mutually inconsistent propositions.
In accepting (15) as the principle of clarity and
distinctness, though, Frankfurt might have us revise it
to avoid what he considers a redundancy. He states that
for Descartes:
To perceive something clearly and distinctly,
however, is to be aware of grounds for believ-
es lt
oi
S0 comPlete that no basis for doubt re-
He interprets Descartes as maintaining ( 9 ) with its claim
that an individual's clear and distinct perceptions are
always metaphysically certain for him. 3 ^ Presumably, he
31 Ibid
. ,
164.
32While Frankfurt follows Doney in ascribing ( 9 ) to
Descartes, he does not appear to limit the objects of clear
and distinct perception to some proper subset of the set
of true propositions.
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would have us restate the principle of clarity and distinct-
ness more simply as:
(16) If you are clearly and distinctly perceiv-ing p at t, accept p at t
.
We still have to discover what it is for (16) to be
an acceptable rule of evidence. In this regard, Frankfurt
tells US:
In seeking. to understand what Descartes is afterm his validation of reason, and to evaluate thecogency o± his argument, it is useful to recallhis procedure m determining the reliability ofhis senses in the F irst Meditation
. The troublehe found there with sensory evidence was thathe senses, might for all he knew, provide con-flicting testimony: his basis for rejecting the
rules of sensory evidence was essentially that
someone following. these
. rules might conceivablybe led to accept inconsistent evidence
. Now itis reasonable to suppose that when he considers
reason Descartes wishes to discover whether the
rule of reason the principle of clear and dis-tinct perception-
-passes the test that the rules
of sensory evidence failed.
. . . The presumption
that his attempt to validate reason parallels
his at tempt to validate the senses suggests that
what he. wants to know about clear and distinct
perceptions is whether they are consistent with
one another .
H
According to Frankfurt, Descartes tries to demonstrate that
(16) is an acceptable rule of evidence in that he tries
to demonstrate that it meets one requirement for being such
a rule
. This is the requirement that each proposition it
directs him to accept is consistent with every other one it
directs him to accept.
A more developed version of Frankfurt's position seems
33Ibid.
,
170.
25
to be this
.
A rule of evidence is a sentence that has the
conditional form exemplified by (15) and (l6) ^ direots
us to accept particular propositions under certain circum-
stances
.
34 There are a number of requirements that a rule
of evidence must satisfy to be acceptable
. One of these is
especially important to Descartes. It is the requirement
that each proposition the rule directs us to accept must
be consistent with every other one it directs us to accept
.
35
Descartes wants to demonstrate that the principle of clarity
and distinctness meets this requirement. More exactly, he
wants to demonstrate:
(17) If
^ (16) directs S.to accept p at t, then
p is consistent with the conjunction of
every other proposition that ( 16 ) directs
S to accept at t.
Two of Frankfurt's statements help clarify what it is
for Descartes to demonstrate ( 1 ?).
He (DescartesJ establishes truths by removing thegrounds for doubting them rather than proving
them in a direct way . 36
Descartes' argument, then, is an attempt to
show that there are no good reasons for believ-
ing that reason is unreliable . 37
These passages suggest that Frankfurt understands the notion
of a demonstration in such a way that an individual demonstrates
^ Ibid
. , 33 & 34 .
3^ Ibid .
,
34
.
36 Ibid
. ,
174.
37 Ibid.
, 175.
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a proposition if and only if he follows an argument that
leads him to be metaphysically certain of it. His answer
to ( 1 ), therefore, may be given in a sentence. Descartes’
task is to attain an epistemic state in which he is meta-
physically certain of ( 17 ).
There are, however, two serious difficulties with this
answer. It lacks strong textual support, and it does not
adequately explain some of Descartes' most important state-
ments about his task.
Frankfurt does not make any straightforward attempts
to summon textual support for his answer. However, in pre-
senting it he writes:
The presumption that his (Descartes H attempt to
validate reason parallels his attempt to vali-date the senses suggests that what he wants toknow about clear and distinct perceptions is
whether they are consistent with one another.
The conception of truth involved in his ques-
on
. about the truth of what is clearly anddistinctly perceived is, in other words, a
conception of coherence rather than of cor-
respondence
.
This passage suggests that he believes there are two sources
oT textual support for his answer. The first is Descartes'
examination of the reliability of his senses in the First
Meditation
. According to Frankfurt, Descartes is concerned
there with whether some rules of sensory evidence might
lead him to accept mutually inconsistent propositions, and
the fact that Descartes has this concern supports his answer
38 Ibid.
,
170.
2?
to (1). The second is Descartes' assertion that in ac-
complishing his task he demonstrates that all his clear and
distinct perceptions are true. Frankfurt maintains that in
making this claim Descartes has a coherence theory of truth
m mind, and that, once it is understood in this light,
Descartes' assertion supports his answer.
The first source, however, provides Frankfurt with
very little, if any, textual support. Even if Descartes
were concerned in the First Meditation with whether some
rules of sensory evidence might lead him to adopt mutually
inconsistent propositions, his having this concern would
not provide any substantial support for Frankfurt’s answer.
The question that concerns Descartes in the Third and Fourth
Meditation might be entirely different from the ones that
concern him in the Lirst Meditation regarding his senses.
Moreover, Frankfurt does not cite any passages from the
Meditation in which Descartes presents a rule of evi-
dence and considers whether it might lead him to adopt
mutually inconsistent propositions. Nor do there appear to
be any such passages
.
The second source also fails to provide Frankfurt with
the textual support he needs. There are passages in which
Descartes claims that in accomplishing his task he becomes
metaphysically certain that all his clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true.^ 7 But, Frankfurt fails to show that
^Haldane and Ross, I, 178 & 184.
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Descartes has a coherence theory of truth in mind when he
makes this claim. Also, even if we allow that Descartes
does have such a theory of truth in mind, his claim does
not provide any substantial support for Frankfurt's answer.
To show that Descartes has a coherence theory of truth
m mind when he makes this claim. Frankfurt cites his state-
ment that:
To begin with, directly we think that we riehtlv
ourselves
S
°h"^
h
it^i
^aneously Persuaff
1
"
t at is true. Further, if this
i°
n
X
1C
Ji
0n 1S S0 strone that we have no reasonto doubt concerning that of the truth of whi?hwe have persuaded ourselves there isto enquire about; we havl lil the certaintv fhaf
6
can reasonably be desired. What is it tS us^?
thina
n
of
Sh
h
Ula Perhaps imagine that the verylpg w ose truth we have been so firmly" per-suaded appears false to God or to an angel a^d
C
sr!^ence “ is falEe spring T-
falsnv
y '
since"
d ° W® care about this absolutesity, we by no means believe in it orhave the least suspicion of it? For we are Pur-posing a persuasion so firm that it can in no
P
V*y De removed--a persuasion, therefore, thatls exactly -he same as the most perfect certitude.
Frankfurt claims that in this passage
,
Descartes evidently recognizes that his position-
entails that from our knowing something with per-fect certitude it does not follow that it is,
speaking aosolutely", true. He explicitly
concedes, in other words, that he has not proventhat whatever is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived is "absolutely true". What he suggestsis that if something that is perfectly certain
may be absolutely false, then the notions of
absolute truth and absolute falsity are ir-
relevant to the purposes of inquiry. His
40
40
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29
account makes it clear that the notion of truththat
j
i_s relevant is a notion of coherence ,4l
He also states that in this passage Descartes "denies that
the truth he seeks consists in the correspondence of a be-
lief to a reality."^
Frankfurt's interpretation of this passage seems to
be this. Descartes is considering a situation in which he
is metaphysically certain of a proposition as a result of
clearly and distinctly perceiving it. In the third sentence
of the passage, Descartes acknowledges that that proposition
might appear false to God or to an angel and so be false
absolutely'
, despite his clear and distinct perception of
it. In doing so, he is acknowledging that it might be
false in the sense of failing to correspond to reality.
On the basis of his interpretation, Frankfurt reasons
as follows. Given that this interpretation is correct,
Descartes cannot regard himself as metaphysically certain
that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true in
the sense of corresponding with reality. He here admits
that some of his clear and distinct perceptions may not be
true in that sense. It is reasonable to assume, therefore,
that when he claims to be metaphysically certain of the
truth of his clear and distinct perceptions, he understands
the notion of truth in terms of a coherence, rather than
41
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a correspondence, theory.
Frankfurt's interpretation of this passage is unsat-
isfactory. While Descartes is considering a situation in
which he is metaphysically certain of a proposition as a
result of clearly and distinctly perceiving it, he is not
acknowledging the possibility that the proposition appears
false to God or to an angel. He later states that:
Again there is no difficulty though someone feignthat the truth. appears false to God or to an angelbecause the evidence of our perceptions does not
allow us to pay any attention to such a fiction. ^3
Descartes characterizes the claim that the proposition he
clearly and distinctly perceives appears false to God or
to an angel as a fiction that someone might feign. He does
not, then, think that that claim might be true.
A correct interpretation of the passage is this. In
the first tw© sentences, Descartes introduces a situation
in which he is metaphysically certain of a proposition he
clearly and distinctly perceives. In the next three, he
considers whether in this situation he should be concerned
by the fact that someone else thinks the object of his
clear and distinct perception appears false to God or to an
angel. His position is that he should not be concerned by
it. Since he is metaphysically certain of the object of
his clear and distinct perception, his evidence for it is
^%aldane and Ross, II, 42.
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strong enough to resist any reason for doubt, including any
that might arise from someone's believing it appears false
to God or to an angel.
Furthermore, even if Descartes has a coherence theory
in mind when he claims that the accomplishment of his task
makes him metaphysically certain of the truth of his clear
and distinct perceptions, his doing so does not provide
any direct support for Frankfurt's answer. Unless we at-
tribute a very implausible coherence theory to Descartes,
his claim is not equivalent to the one that the accomplish-
ment of his task makes him metaphysically certain all his
clear and distinct perceptions are mutually consistent.
Nor does it imply that claim.
As already noted, Frankfurt's answer has another
drawback besides its lack of textual support. It does not
adequately explain three of Descartes ' most important and
interesting statements about his task. Having completed
his attempt, Descartes writes:
And so I clearly recognize that the certainty
and truth of all knowledge depends alone on
the knowledge of the true God, in so much that,
before I knew Him I could not have a perfect
knowledge of any other thing. ^4
Descartes claims his knowing that God exists and is not a
deceiver is a necessary condition of his having perfect
knowledge of any other proposition.
44
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He later modifies this claim.
When I said that we could know nothing with cer-tainty unless we were first aware that God existedI announced m express terms that I referred onlyto the science apprehending such conclusions as
c^r. recur in memory without attendinr further to
—
3- proofs which led me to make them . 4"3
"
Descartes' position is that his knowing God exists and is not
a deceiver is a necessary condition of his having perfect
knowledge of those propositions that can recur in his
memory without his attending to his proofs of them.
He gives an example of the sort of propositions he
has in mind. He considers whether an atheist can have per-
fect knowledge that the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles and writes:
That an atheist can know clearly that the angles
tr iangle are equal to two right angle
s
, I
do not deny. I merely affirm that, on the other
hand, such knowledge on his part cannot con-
stitute true science, because no knowledge that
can be rendered doubtful should be called science.
Since he is as supposed, an Atheist, he cannot
be sure that he is not deceived in the things
that seem most evident to him. . . .46
To Descartes, then, an atheist cannot have perfect knowledge
of the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles. He cannot have such knowledge of this theorem be-
cause he does not know God exists and is not a deceiver.
In these passages, then, Descartes adopts the follow-
ing position. The accomplishment of his task causes him to
43Ibid
. ,
II, 38 .
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satisfy a necessary condition of having perfect knowledge
of propositions of a particular sort. This condition is
that he know that God exists and is not a deceiver. An
example of the sort of proposition he has in mind is the
theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles.
Several aspects of Descartes' position need to be
explained. It is not clear how we are to understand the
notions of knowledge and perfect knowledge that are in-
volved in it. It is also unclear what sort of proposition
is exemplified in this instance by the theorem that the
angles of a triangle equal two right angles. Finally, it
is not clear why Descartes thinks his knowledge of God's
existence and nondeceptive nature is a necessary condition
of his perfect knowledge of propositions of that sort. It
is reasonable to expect that any successful answer to (1)
will provide adequate explanations of these points.
Frankfurt does not provide such explanations, however.
With regard to Descartes' position, he writes:
Now at a time when we are having no clear and
distinct perceptions, we may recall having once
perceived something clearly and distinctly.
Descartes maintains that if we know that God
exists we are entitled to accept the fact that
something was once clearly and distinctly
perceived as conclusively establishing its
truth. The recollection then suffices to es-
tablish the truth of what we remember per-
ceiving. But, if God's existence is not known,
he claims, we must suspect that what we remember
perceiving clearly and distinctly may be false
even though we once clearly and distinctly per-
ceived it and were at that time incapable of
doubting it. For without the knowledge of God,
'I can persuade myself that nature has made me
34
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This is a very incomplete explanation of Descartes' position
Frankfurt states that, according to Descartes, knowing that
God exists is a necessary condition of being metaphysically
certain of a proposition on the basis of the fact that it
has been clearly and distinctly perceived earlier. He
does not, however, explain in what way we have to know
that God exists or what it is for an individual to be meta-
physically certain of a proposition on the basis of the
fact that he has previously clearly and distinctly perceived
it. He also does not state how any of this relates to an
individual's ability to have perfect knowledge of such prop-
ositions as the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal
two right angles.
Nor does there seem to be a way of interpreting
Frankfurt's statement so that it provides an adequate ex-
planation of Descartes' position. The most plausible at-
tempt to do so seems to be this
. For an individual to be
metaphysically certain of a proposition on the basis of
the fact that he has clearly and distinctly perceived it
is for him to be metaphysically certain of it on the meta-
physically certain evidence that he has clearly and dis-
tinctly perceived it. In claiming that he has perfect
knowledge of the theorem that the angles of a triangle
j—
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equal two right angles only if he knows God exists and is
not a deceiver, Descartes intends to claim that he is meta-
physically certain of this theorem only if he is metaphysic-
ally certain of God's existence and nondeceptive nature. He
is led to make this claim by two of his beliefs. The first
is that he is metaphysically certain of this theorem only
if he is metaphysically certain of some propositions on
the metaphysically certain evidence that he has clearly
and distinctly perceived them. The second is that he is
metaphysically certain of propositions in this way only if
he is metaphysically certain of God's existence and non-
deceptive nature. His reason for maintaining this second
belief is that unless he is metaphysically certain of the
existence and nondeceptive nature of God, the hypothesis thax
God is a deceiver provides him with a reason to doubt any
proposition evidenced solely by his metaphysical certainty
of having clearly and distinctly perceived it.
This attempt to explain Descartes' position is un-
successful. There do not appear to be any passages in which
Descartes claims he is not metaphysically certain that the
angles of a triangle equal two right angles unless he is
metaphysically certain of some propositions on the meta-
physically certain evidence that he has clearly and dis-
tinctly perceived them. On Frankfurt's own interpretation,
Descartes is committed to the claim that he can be meta-
physically certain of that theorem without being metaphysic-
36
ally certain of God's existence and nondeceptive nature.
Frankfurt attributes (9) to Descartes, and Descartes him-
self acknowledges that he can clearly and distinctly per-
ceive this theorem without being metaphysically certain that
God exists and is not a deceiver. He writes that "I who
have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry
recognize quite clearly that the angles of a triangle equal
two right angles.
.
.
,
and he claims he clearly and dis-
tinctly perceives this theorem even though he is "ignorant
of there being a God."^
In all, Frankfurt's answer to (1) is open to two
fatal objections. It lacks textual support, and it does
not adequately explain three of Descartes' most important
statements regarding his task.
7. Stated briefly, Frankfurt's answer to (2) is
s
Descartes' way of dealing with this problem is
well known. He demonstrates that there is a
being--God--who is both omnipotent and benign.
And then from the fact that God is benevolent
and hence not a deceiver, he infers that the
truth of what is clearly and distinctly per-
ceived has a divine guarantee .^9
His answer seems to be the following. To accomplish his
task, Descartes follows an argument for (17) that he thinks
will make him metaphysically certain of it. In that argu-
ment, he first derives the premise that God exists and is
^Haldane and Ross, I, 184.
^Frankfurt, Demons
,
156 .
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not a deceiver from some other premises; then he employs
that premise to derive (17).
Two points need to he clarified here. First, if
Descartes maintains (9) as Frankfurt claims, why does he
not try to become metaphysically certain of ( 17 ) by clearly
and distinctly perceiving it? Second, why does Descartes
believe his argument for ( 17 ) will lead him to be metaphysic-
ally certain of it?
Frankfurt does not consider these questions directly,
but his statements suggest answers to them. He claims that
in following his argument Descartes attempts to clearly and
distinctly perceive each one of its premises simultaneously
with his clear and distinct perception of its conclusion.-^ 0
He also suggests that for Descartes some but not all true
propositions are such that to clearly and distinctly per-
ceive them he must follow arguments for them.^1
These statements by Frankfurt suggest the following
answer to the first question. Descartes does try to become
metaphysically certain of ( 1
7
) by clearly and distinctly
perceiving it; his argument for (17) is an attempt to do so.
In this regard we can define the notion of a deduction.
(18) S deduces p at t=df. S clearly and dis-
tinctly perceives p at t as a result of
clearly and distinctly perceiving the
5 °Ibid
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premises of an argument A having p as its con-
clusion at t and clearly and distinctly per-
ceiving that the premises of A entail p at t
.
Descartes constructs an argument for (17) in an attempt to
deduce it. With regard to the second question, Descartes
believes his argument will make him metaphysically certain
of (17) because he accepts (9) and believes his argument
will lead him to deduce ( 17 ).
There is textual support for some parts of this answer
to (2). Descartes does present an argument for the claim
that God exists and is not a deceiver, and he claims to
clearly and distinctly perceive every premise of that argu-
ment. Having presented its premises, he writes:
To speak the . truth, I see nothing in all that I
have just said which by the light of nature is
not manifest to anyone who desires to think
attentively on the subject. . . .52
In writing of the light of nature, Descartes seems to have
his faculty of clear and distinct perception in mind. -5-'
The most important part of Frankfurt's answer is
nevertheless without textual support. There are no passages
in which Descartes attempts to deduce (17) by inferring the
mutual consistency of his clear and distinct perceptions
from God's existence and nondeceptive nature.
-^Haldane and Ross, I, 1 67 •
"-^For a passage in which Descartes appears to identi-
fy the light of nature and clear and distinct perception
see Haldane and Ross, I, 231*
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8
. In response to ( 3 ), Frankfurt rejects Arnauld
* s ob
jection and presents one of his own. His response to
Arnauld 's objection is rather confusing, however.
snffw ^
d L that Descartes ’ argument does not
tv
f]
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0In the commonly charged circularityMetaphysical doubt concerns the truth of whatclearly and distinctly perceived, and theremoval of this doubt is effected without as-suming that what is clearly and distinctly per-ceived is true. It is removed simply by theknowledge that a certain demonstration has beenaccomplished. This knowledge is, of course,that certain things have been clearly and dis-tinctiy perceived. But, that the truth of thesethings be supposed is not required, and so thequestion is not begged. 5A
In writing of Descartes' attempt to remove his metaphysical
doubt, Frankfurt seems to have in mind Descartes' attempt
to become metaphysically certain of ( 17 ). Yet, he claims
Descartes attempts to accomplish his task by coming to
know that he clearly and distinctly perceives some prop-
ositions. On his own response to (2), this is incorrect.
On that response, Descartes' attempt involves his clearly
and distinctly perceiving some propositions, but it does
not involve his knowing that he does so.
It is likely that Frankfurt intends to present the
following response to Arnauld. Arnauld and his fellow
critics have understood Descartes to be claiming that
until he accomplishes his task none of his clear and
54Frankfurt, Demons
. 177.
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distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain, and that
to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically certain
of some of his clear and distinct perceptions. Understand-
ing him m this way, they have charged that, on his own
position, Descartes' attempt can be successful only if he
has already accomplished his task when he makes it. They
have, however, misunderstood Descartes' position. He
does not maintain that until he accomplishes his task none
of his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically
certain for him. He accepts (9) with its claim that his
clear and distinct perceptions are always metaphysically
certain
.
As I noted with regard to Doney
' s interpretation, this
response to Amauld's objection is successful only if we
can attribute (9) to Descartes and correctly answer our
questions. But Frankfurt has not provided us with any
reason to think we can do so.
Frankfurt's own objection is this:
Descartes seems to have overlooked the follow-
ing embarassing question: Given that reason
leads to the conclusion that reason is reliable
because a varacious God exists, may it not also
lead to the conclusion that there is an omni-
potent demon whose existence renders reason un-
reliable? These two conclusions are incompat-
ible, to be sure, and if the proper use of
reason established both of them, this would
mean that reason is not reliable. But Descartes
cannot simply take it for granted that this is
not the case
. His procedure does seem to beg
the question, therefore, although it does so
4l
in a rather different way than has generallybeen thought. 55 y
Frankfurt's objection seems to be as follows. We may grant
Descartes that by following his argument he is able to de-
duce (17). However, his deduction of ( 17 ) i s insufficient
to make him metaphysically certain of it.- At the time of
his deduction, he is not metaphysically certain that he
could never deduce both (1?) and its negation. The hypothe
sis that he might someday do so provides him with a reason
to doubt ( 17 ) despite his deduction of it.
Even if Frankfurt has correctly interpreted Descartes
argument, this objection is at best inconclusive. It is
an attempt to present a counter-example to (9). Yet,
Frankfurt does not sufficiently clarify that principle
for us to be able to evaluate his objection. He does not
consider what arguments Descartes might present for ( 9 ),
and he does not sufficiently clarify the notions of meta-
physical certainty and clear and distinct perception
that are essential to our understanding of it.
In conclusion, Frankfurt, like Doney, attributes
(9) to Descartes and fails to answer my questions correctly
In the next chapter, I shall consider one more attempt to
combine the ascription of this principle to Descartes with
successful answers to my questions.
53Ibid.
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CHAPTER II
Anthony Kenny also interprets Descartes as accepting
(9) with its claim that clear and distinct perceptions are
always metaphysically certain. In this chapter, I will
show that his interpretation fails to answer my questions
correctly, even on the assumption that Descartes accepts
(9)* will also argue that no interpretation that as-
cribes (9) to Descartes can successfully answer my ques-
tions .
1. Kenny’s answers are exceedingly vague and undeveloped . 1
In considering ques oion (1 /
,
he introduces a kind of cer-
tainty he terms 'Cartesian certainty' and claims that
Descartes' task is to attain an epistemic state in which
he can elevate some true propositions to the status of
Cartesian certainties. Kenny does not, however, present
a straightforward definition of Cartesian certainty. Nor
does he explain whether Descartes is interested in every
true proposition or only in some of them.
1 Anthony Kenny, Descartes : A Study of His Philosophy
(New York: Random Housed 1 968 ) . Anthony Kenny, "The Car-
tesian Circle and the Eternal Truths, " Journal of Philoso -
phy
, 67, 19 (1970), 685 -699 . Anthony Kenny, "A Reply,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy
, 9. 4 (1971), 497-498.
2Kenny, Descartes
, 190.
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With regard to question (2), Kenny fails to give a
detailed statement of Descartes' attempt. With regard to
(3), he follows Doney and Frankfurt in attributing (9) to
Descartes, but it is not clear whether he adopts their
response to Arnauld.
Furthermore, the two most plausible ways of clarify-
ing and developing his interpretation fail to yield correct
answers to these questions. One way of clarifying his
answer to (1) is suggested by his statement:
It is not enough for Cartesian certainty that
I should here and now unhesitatingly make a
true judgement on the best possible grounds.
It is .necessary also that I should be in such
a position that I will never hereafter have
reason to withdraw that judgement.
3
This suggests that Kenny understands the notion of Cartesian
certainty in terms of metaphysical certainty. A proposition
is a Cartesian certainty for an individual just and only in
case he does not have a reason to doubt it and he never will.
Kenny might, then, accept:
(19) p is a Cartesian certainty for S at t =df.
p is a metaphysical certainty for S at t
and there is no time t ' later than t such
that p is metaphysically uncertain for S
at t ' .
Further light is shed upon his answer by his claim
that, according to Descartes:
Whenever I clearly and distinctly perceive some-
^Ibid.
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thing I cannot help judging that itthis
_ will be a true judgement madepossible grounds.
. .
.4
is so, and
on the best
In attributing to Descartes the claim that whenever an
individual clearly and distinctly perceives a proposition
he has the best possible grounds for believing it, Kenny
appears to be ascribing ( 9 ) to him.
Assuming Kenny attributes (9) and ( 19 ) to Descartes,
we can fill out the rest of his answer to ( 1 ). Descartes
wants to attain an epistemic state in which his clear and
distinct perception of a proposition suffices to make it
a Cartesian certainty for him. He believes that while his
clear and distinct perception of a proposition in his in-
itial position makes it a metaphysical certainty for him,
it does not make it a Cartesian one. At some later time,
he will cease to perceive the proposition clearly and
distinctly
,
and when he does so it will no longer be meta-
physically certain for him.
This way of understanding Kenny's answer is suggested
by some of his other statements. Placing himself in
Descartes' initial position, he writes:
Whenever I clearly and distinctly perceive some-
thing I cannot help judging that it is so, and
this will be a true judgement made on the best
possible grounds. But, until I have proved the
4
Ibid.
, 192.
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^
y 1 cannot be sure I shall notereafter withdraw this judgement under theinfluence of the metaphysical suspicion of anomnipotent deceiver.
5
Putting himself in Descartes' position, Kenny sees himself
as being metaphysically certain of his clear and distinct
perceptions, but as not having Cartesian certainty of them.
Once he ceases clearly and distinctly perceiving a propo-
sition, the hypothesis that God deceives him provides him
with a reason to doubt it.
This way of understanding Kenny is also suggested by
his statement that, "What Descartes seeks, then, is a state
of mind that is in a certain sense immutable."^ Apparently,
Descartes seeks such a state in that he seeks one in which
his clear and distinct perception of a proposition makes
him metaphysically certain of it for the rest of his life.
Kenny refers us to two passages in support of this
answer to (1). The first is Descartes' statement that un-
til he accomplishes his task he has "no true and certain
science but only vague and changeable opinions.""'7 Kenny
appears to interpret Descartes as claiming that until he
accomplishes his task no proposition is a Cartesian cer-
tainty for him, although some are metaphysically certain
for him for brief periods of time. This interpretation
^Ibid.
6
Ibid.
^Haldane and Ross, I, 184.
46
reads a good deal into Descartes' statement.
The second passage provides more definite support for
his answer.
That gn. atheist can know clearly that the angles
—
— ^
lan iT-L - are equal _to two right angles. Ido not deny. I merely affirm that, on the otherhana, such knowledge on his part cannot consti-tute true science, because no knowledge that canbe rendered doubtful should be called science.Since he is, as is supposed, an atheist, he
cannot know that he is not deceived in the thingsthat seem most evident to him.
.
. ; he cannot be
safe from this doubt unless he first recognizes
the existence of God.°
Kenny does not state exactly how this passage supports his
position
.
However, it is reasonable to suppose he understands it
in the following way. Descartes is contrasting his ability
to become certain of the theorem that the angles of a
triangle equal two right angles once he accomplishes his
task with an atheist's inability to do so. Since he
adopts (9), Descartes is not contrasting his ability to
become metaphysically certain of this theorem with an athe-
ist's inability to do so. He acknowledges in the first
sentence that an atheist can clearly and distinctly per-
ceive it. He must, therefore, be concerned with some other
kind of certainty. His statement that an atheist's know-
ledge of the theorem can be rendered doubtful suggests that
he has Cartesian certainty in mind. He appears to be
gAdam and Tannery, VII, 14. This is Kenny's transla-
tion of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
47
asserting that while an atheist may be metaphysically
certain of that theorem at a time due to his clear and dis-
tinct perception of it, he will be metaphysically uncertain
of it at a later one
.
On the assumption that Descartes accepts (9), then,
this passage can be plausibly interpreted so that it sup-
ports Kenny's answer. As already noted, this assumption
is granted to him for the sake of argument.
Upon close examination, however, it is clear that
Kenny's answer is incorrect. His answer interprets Descartes
as setting a very unrealistic task for himself. According
to it, Descartes attempts to attain an epistemic state in
which his clear and distinct perception of a proposition
p will make him metaphysically certain of p for the rest
of his life
. It is highly doubtful that Descartes can
attain such a state short of ending his life.^
A state of this sort is one in which his clear and
distinct perception of p is sufficient to preclude his ever
again having a reason to doubt p. For example, Descartes'
clear and distinct perception of p while he is in it pre-
cludes his later having as his evidence for p the fact that
9
'Descartes might, of course, attain such an epistemic
state by placing himself on his death bed. At the moment
of his death, his clear and distinct perception of any prop-
osition will suffice to make it a Cartesian Certainty for
him. If this is the only way in which he can accomplish
this task, it is hardly a realistic one.
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he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving it. If
this is Descartes' evidence for p at some time, the hypoth-
esis that his memory is mistaken provides him with a reason
to doutt it. Descartes' clear and distinct perception of
p while he is in such a state also precludes his later
forgetting that he has done so and having as his evidence
for p the fact that some stranger asserts that it is true .
If this is Descartes' evidence for p, the hypothesis that
the stranger deceives him provides him with a reason to
doubt it. It is unlikely, however, that, short of ending
Hie
, Descartes can attain a state in which his clear
and distinct perception of p precludes his ever again being
in such situations as these.
Moreover
,
even if we grant Kenny that his answer to
(1) is correct, he is still unable to answer (2) success-
fully in terms of it. Descartes' argument is devoted to
establishing two propositions, A and B. The former is the
proposition that God exists and is not a deceiver; the lat-
ter is the principle that all Descartes' clear and distinct
perceptions are true. Given his answer to (1), Kenny cannot
plausibly interpret Descartes as attempting to make A and
B Cartesian certainties for himself. On his answer to (1),
Descartes is unable to make any proposition a Cartesian
certainty until he has completed his argument. However,
Kenny might interpret Descartes as attempting to become meta-
physically certain of A and B by clearly and distinctly
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perceiving them. He might then regard Descartes as claim-
ing that his metaphysical certainty of them places him in
the epistemic state he desires.
It is very implausible, though, that Descartes' becom-
ing metaphysically certain of A and B places him in the po-
sition he supposedly desires. Suppose Descartes becomes
metaphysically certain of these propositions and also clear-
ly and distinctly perceives p. That he is metaphysically
certain of A and E and clearly and distinctly perceiving
p does not imply that p is a Cartesian certainty for him.
It does not imply that he is never again in a situation in
which he has a reason to doubt p. It does not preclude his
later forgetting having clearly and distinctly perceived p
and having as his evidence for p the fact that some stranger
claims it is true. In such a situation, the hypothesis
that the stranger deceives him provides Descartes with a
reason to doubt p.
When understood in this manner, then, Kenny's inter-
pretation fails to answer (1) and (2) correctly. Given
this, it is clear that it also fails to answer (3) success-
fully .
(2) There is, however, another way in which Kenny might
define Cartesian certainty and answer my questions. At one
point, he introduces a kind of certainty he terms 'psycho-
logical certainty' and attributes a number of principles
regarding it to Descartes. He employs his notion of
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psychological certainty to distinguish between what he calls
first-order doubt’ and 'second-order doubt
’ , and states that
in attempting to establish the existence of God, Descartes
is trying to free himself from second-order doubt .'*' 0 This
suggests that he intends to define Cartesian certainty in
terms of second-order doubt and to answer my questions
accordingly
.
I shall begin clarifying Kenny's position along these
lines by examining his notion of psychological certainty.
Kenny considers this passage from the Third Meditation :
And, on the other hand, always when I direct my
attention to things which I believe myself to
perceive very clearly, I am so persuaded of
their truth that I let myself break into words
such as these: Let who will deceive me, He can
never cause me to be nothing while I think I ami,
or someday cause it to be true to say that I
have never been, it being true now to say that
I am, or that two and three make more or less
than five, or any such things in which I see a
manifest contradiction .11
He claims Descartes is here "expressing his psychological
certainty of such propositions as that 2 + 3 =
While he does not define psychological certainty,
Kenny claims that whenever an individual is psychologically
*
°Kenny
,
Descartes
,
184.
Haldane and Ross, I, 158*
12
Kenny, Journal of Philosophy
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certain of a proposition, he cannot help affirming its
1 3truth. It is reasonable to suppose he accepts the fol-
lowing definition.
(20) p is psychologically certain for S at
i * ? believes p at t and S is unableto refrain from doing so at t.
Psychological certainty is very different from what I have
been calling 'metaphysical certainty'. An individual may
be psychologically certain of a proposition even though
he has a reason to doubt it. He might be unaware of his
reason for doubting a proposition and sufficiently con-
vinced of it to affirm it and to be unable to refrain
from doing so. He might also be psychologically uncertain
of a proposition even though he does not have any reason
to doubt it. Even in the absence of a reason for doubting
a proposition, he might refrain from affirming it.
Kenny attributes two principles concerning psycholog-
ical certainty to Descartes. The first is that "anyone
whose ideas are clear and distinct cannot help but affirm
the truth of what those ideas represent." More exactly,
he regards Descartes as accepting:
(21) If S clearly and distinctly perceives p
at t, then S is psychologically certain
of p at t.
As evidence for ascribing this principle to Descartes,
Kenny refers us to his statement that, " . . . I am of such
3Ibid
4
Ibid
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a nature that as long as I understand anything very clearly
and distinctly, I am naturally impelled to believe it to
be true .... He appears to be correct in his view
that Descartes maintains (21).
The second principle is:
(22) Some true propositions are such that if
S apprehends them at t, S is psycholog-ically certain of them at t.
Apprehending a proposition is a necessary, but not a suf-
ficient condition of clearly and distinctly perceiving it
The fact that someone apprehends a proposition does not
imply its truth or its metaphysical certainty.
Kenny has adequate evidence for ascribing (22) to
Descartes. He refers us to Descartes' statement that some
true propositions are "so evident and at the same time so
simple, that we cannot think of them without believing
them to be true. . . .•'lc He also notes that Descartes
provides the proposition that what is done cannot be undone
as an example of one that satisfies ( 22 ).
With definition (20) and principles (21) and (22)
before us, we can examine Kenny's distinction between first
and second-order doubt. He considers Descartes' statement:
When I was considering some very simple and easy
point in arithmetic or geometry, e.g. that two
and three together make five, did I perceive
this clearly enough to assert its truth? My
^Haldane and Ross, I, I 83 .
l 6
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only reason for judging afterwards that it waspossible for me to doubt these things was thatit occurred to me that perhaps some God could
have given me such a nature that I was deceived
even about what seemed most obvious. Now when-
ever the preconceived view that there is a
supremely powerful God occurs to me
,
I am forced
to admit that He could easily, if He wishes,
make me go wrong even in the things which I be-
lieve I know most clearly
. But whenever I turn
to the things themselves which I think I perceive
very clearly, I am so convinced by them that I
cannot help exclaiming, "Let who can deceive me,
he . can never bring it about that I am nothing
while I think I am something, nor that it should
ever be true that I have never existed, since it
is now true that I exist, nor even that two and
three together should make more or less than
five, or other such things in which I see a
manifest contradiction."
. . .The argument from
the possibility of a divine deceiver (is) a very
slight--so to say metaphysical--reason for doubt-
ing . 1 <
As its contents suggest, this passage occurs at the begin-
ning of the Third Meditation .
With regard to it, Kenny writes:
The passage suggests a distinction between a
first-order and a second-order doubt. Take the
proposition, "What's done cannot be undone."
If I explicitly think of this proposition,
Descartes says, I cannot at that moment doubt
it, that is, I cannot help judging that it
is true. However, though I cannot doubt this
proposition while my mind's eye is on it, I can,
as it were turn away from it and doubt it in a
round about manner. I can refer to it under some
general heading, such as "What seems to me most
obvious"; and I can raise the whole question
whether everything that seems to me most obvious
may not in fact be false .... The axioms are
thus generically doubtful while severally
17Adam and Tannery, VII, 36. This is Kenny's trans-
lation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
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indubitable
. While in doubt about the authormy nature
,
I do not know whether the lightof nature is a true or a false light. This
second-order doubt is the metaphysical doubttnat cannot be removed except by provine thp
existence of a veracious God. 18
Roughly stated, Kenny's point appears to be this. In the
fourth sentence of this passage, Descartes states he cannot
refrain from affirming such propositions as that two and
three equal five, whenever he apprehends them. We can
capture his claim by saying he cannot doubt such propositions
in a first-order way. In the first three sentences, how-
ever, he claims he can doubt such propositions indirectly,
despite his apprehension of them. He can refer to them
by some description and abstain from affirming the claim
that everything satisfying that description is true. We
can capture this by saying that he can doubt these prop-
ositions in a second-order way.
The following definition appears to capture Kenny's
concept of first-order doubt.
(23) p is doubtful for S in a first-order way
at t =df. S apprehends p at t and S is
psychologically uncertain of p at t.
In the presence of (22) with its claim that some true propo-
sitions are psychologically certain for Descartes whenever
he apprehends them, ( 23 ) implies that some truths are never
doubtful for Descartes in a first-order way.
It is not clear how we are to define the concept of
lE
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second-order doubt. Initially, we might try:
(24) p is doubtful for S in a second-order
way at t
-df. there is a description
Q such that S refers to p by Q at t
and the proposition expressed by 'every
Q is true is psychologically uncertain
i or S at t.
This might seem to capture Kenny's idea. He states that
Descartes doubts the proposition that what is done cannot
be undone in a second-order way by referring to it by the
description 'what seems most obvious to Descartes' and
being psychologically uncertain of the proposition that
what seems most obvious to Descartes is true.
However, (24) cannot be what Kenny has in mind. He
states that for Descartes an individual can only resolve
his second-order doubt of a proposition by proving that
God exists. On (24), an individual can resolve his second-
order doubt of a proposition simply by not referring to it
.
It appears that Kenny would accept the definition:
(25) p is doubtful for S in a second-order way
at t =df
.
there is a description Q such
that p satisfies Q at t and the proposi-
tion expressed by 'every Q is true' is
psychologically uncertain for p at t
.
This appears to capture his notion. It is in accord with
his claim that the proposition that what is done cannot be
undone is doubtful for Descartes in a second-order way in
his initial position. At that point, that proposition
satisfies the description, 'what seems most obvious to
Descartes', and Descartes is psychologically uncertain of
the proposition that everything that seems most obvious
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to him is true
.
It should be noted that when a proposition is doubt-
ful in a second-order way, a relevant description, Q, may
be either a definite or an indefinite description. Kenny
only writes of definite descriptions here, but he else-
where allows for cases of second-order doubt involving
1 Qdefinite ones. 7
The passage under consideration from the Third and
Fourth Meditation
,
however, does not contain this distinc-
tion between first and second— order doubt. Descartes ac-
cepts (22) and it implies that some propositions are never
doubtful for him in a first-order way. Yet, Descartes does
not claim in this passage that there are such propositions
.
Kenny sees him as doing so in his statement:
But whenever I turn to the things themselves
which I think I perceive very clearly, I am
so convinced by them that I cannot help ex-
claiming "Let who can deceive me, he can never
bring it about that I am nothing while I think
I am something, or that it should ever be true
that I have never existed, since it is now true
that I exist, nor even that two and three to-
gether should make more or less than five, or
other such things in which I see a manifest
contradiction .
"
Yet, instead of claiming that he is psychologically certain
of the propositions he mentions whenever he apprehends them,
Descartes states that he is psychologically certain of them
<*97 .
1 97Kenny, Journal of the History of Philosophy , 9. ^
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whenever he clearly perceives them. This suggests that
he intends to assert (21) with its claim that his clear and
distinct perceptions are always psychologically certain.
Kenny regards Descartes as introducing the notion of
a proposition's being doubtful in a second-order way in his
statement
:
When I was considering some very simple and easy
point in arithmetic or geometry, e.g. that two
and three together make five
,
did I perceive this
clearly enough to assert its truth? My only
reason for judging afterwards that it was pos-
sible for me to doubt these things was that it
occurred to me that perhaps some God could have
given me such a nature that I was deceived even
about what seemed most obvious
. Now whenever the
preconceived view that there is a supremely power-
ful God occurs to me
,
I am forced to admit that
He could easily, if He wishes, make me go wrong
even in the things which I believe I know most
clearly
.
According to Kenny, Descartes is claiming that the proposi-
tion that two and three equal five is doubtful for him in a
second-order way. He is asserting that he is psychologically
uncertain of the proposition that what seemed most obvious
to him is true and that the proposition that two and three
equal five was most obvious to him.
If we consider the rest of this passage, we can see
that Kenny's interpretation of Descartes' statement is in-
correct. Descartes is instead considering a situation in
which he clearly and distinctly perceived the proposition
that two and three equal five, and stating that the hypoth-
esis that God deceives him provided him with a reason for
doubting that proposition despite his clear and distinct
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perception of it. This is supported by his statement at
the end of the passage:
The argument from the possibilitydeceiver (is) a very slight— so tophysical-reason for doubting.
of a divine
say meta-
Descartes regards the hypothesis that God deceives him as
providing him with a reason to doubt the proposition that
two and three equal five. He is concerned, then, with
whether that proposition is metaphysically certain for him,
rather than with whether it is doubtful for him in a second
order way.
Assuming, however, that Descartes does introduce the
notion of second-order doubt here, it appears Kenny would
have us define Cartesian certainty in terms of it. He
claims that according to Descartes "second-order doubt is
the doubt that cannot be removed except by proving the
existence of a veracious God."^ We have seen that he re-
gards the epistemic state in which Descartes can have Carte-
sian certainty of his clear and distinct perceptions as one
he can attain only by establishing the existence of a vera-
cious God. Kenny might, therefore, define Cartesian certain-
ty as:
( 26 ) p is a Cartesian certainty for S at t =df.
p is not doubtful for S in a second-order
way at t.
20
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His answer to my first question, then, might be that Descartes
task is to attain an epistemic state in which all his clear
and distinct perceptions are Cartesian, certainties for him,
where the notion of such a certainty is defined by (26).
This answer to (1) is incorrect, though. It does not
provide an adequate explanation of one of Descartes' most
important claims regarding his task. According to Descartes,
an atheist who has not accomplished his task cannot have
perfect knowledge of some true propositions such as the
theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles.
I have already considered the passage in which Descartes makes
this claim.
Jnderstood in terms of Kenny's answer to (1), his point
seems to be the following. An individual does not have per-
fect knowledge of the theorem that the angles of a triangle
equal two right angles unless it is a Cartesian certainty
for him. Until he accomplishes Descartes' task, and in do-
ing so ceases to be an atheist, an individual cannot make
this theorem a Cartesian certainty for himself.
Yet, while it is not clear exactly how we are to
understand Descartes' notion of perfect knowledge, the
claim that a proposition's being a Cartesian certainty for
an individual is a necessary condition of his having per-
fect knowledge of it is very implausible. It implies that
an individual's perfect knowledge of a proposition is con-
tingent upon facts that are clearly irrelevant to the
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question of whether or not he has perfect knowledge of
it
.
Suppose at some time the theorem that the angles of
a triangle equal two right aneleq ic Q6 ^ ^ ls a Cartesian certainty
for Descartes and he has perfect knowledge of it. At that
time, he is psychologically uncertain that Arnauld ’s
favorite proposition is true. Shortly thereafter, Arnauld
becomes aware of this theorem and it becomes his favorite
proposition. This theorem, then, is no longer a Cartesian
certainty for Descartes. Moreover, on the view we are con-
sidering, Descartes no longer has perfect knowledge of it.
It is very implausible, however, that Descartes’ epistemic
state should change from one in which he has perfect know-
ledge of this theorem to one in which he does not simply
because Arnauld has taken a liking to it.
Furthermore, even if we grant Kenny that this answer
to (l) is correct, he is still unable to answer (2) suc-
cessfully in terms of it. There does not appear to be any
way of interpreting Descartes' argument so that it con-
stitutes a plausible attempt at the task this answer sets
for him.
To appreciate this, consider what Descartes must do
to accomplish that task with regard to a particular prop-
osition. Suppose p is a proposition Descartes clearly
and distinctly perceives in his initial position, p is
not a Cartesian certainty for him at that point. This is
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because he is not psychologically certain of every proposi-
tion expressed by a sentence of the form 'every Q is true'
where Q refers to p. it is reasonable to assume that he
is not psychologically certain of these propositions for at
least one of two reasons. Either he has not discovered all
of them, or he is unable to apprehend all of them simultan-
eously in such a way that he is unable to refrain from
affirming them.
We cannot interpret Descartes* argument in the Third
and Fourth Me ditation so that it constitutes a plausible
attempt to rectify this situation. His argument is devoted
to establishing two claims. The first one, A, is that God
exists and does not deceive Descartes. The second one, B,
is that all Descartes' clear and distinct perceptions are
true. There does not appear to be any way in which Descartes'
establishment of A and B could be plausibly taken to increase
hit awareness of the propositions of which he must become
psychologically certain. Nor does there appear to be any
way in which his establishment of A and B could be plausibly
regarded as affecting his psychological ability to affirm
them simultaneously in such a way that he is unable
to refrain from doing so.
When understood in this way, therefore, Kenny's dis-
cussion again fails to answer (1) and (2) correctly. As
a result, it also fails to answer (3) successfully.
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3. I have considered three interpretations that regard
Descartes as accepting ( 9 ) with its claim that an indivi-
dual's clear and distinct perceptions are always meta-
physically certain. I have shown that each of them fails
to answer my questions correctly. I shall now consider
whether my questions can be correctly answered by an inter-
pretation that ascribes ( 9 ) to Descartes.
They cannot. Any interpretation that ascribes ( 9 )
to Descartes is open to two fatal objections. First, there
IS very little textual evidence for the claim that Descartes
accepts (9) and there is textual evidence against it. Second,
m attributing ( 9 ) to Descartes an interpretation loses its
ability to account adequately for one of his most interest-
ing and important claims regarding his task.
Let us consider what textual evidence, if any, there
is for ascribing (9) to Descartes. None of the commentators
I have considered provides a detailed discussion of this
point, but some of their statements suggest two arguments
they might present.
Doney and Frankfurt claim Descartes identifies his
concept of clear and distinct perception with another one
he presents, that of intuition. Doney cites passages
21
Doney, J ournal of the History of Ideas
.
16
, 2, 327.
Frankfurt, ’’Descartes' Validation of Reason," Descartes:
A Collection of Critical Essays, 210.
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m the Rules as being ones in which Descartes claims his
intuitions are always metaphysically certain for him . 22
This suggests the following argument. There is strong
textual evidence for ascribing this principle to Descartes:
(27) If S intuits p at t, p is metaphysically
certain for S at t . y
Since Descartes identifies intuition and clear and distinct
perception, his acceptance of ( 27 ) commits him to ( 9 ). We
are justified, therefore, in attributing ( 9 ) to him.
One premise of this argument is correct; Descartes
does adopt (2?). At one point in the Rules
, he claims any
proposition he intuits is "as sure as it can be.
.
."^3
It is reasonable to suppose he takes any proposition that
is as sure as it can be to be metaphysically certain for him.
Yet, there is no evidence to suggest that Descartes
identifies clear and distinct perception and intuition and
so commits himself to (9)> Neither Doney nor Frankfurt
cites any textual evidence for their view. One passage
they might regard as supporting their position fails to do
so
.
That passage is Descartes' definition of intuition
in the Rules.
22Doney, Journal of the History of Ideas
, 16, 2, 327.
^Haldane and Ross, I, 20.
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By intuition I understand, not the fluctuatingtestimony of the senses, nor the misleadingjudgement that proceeds from blundering con-
structions of imagination, but the conception
which an unclouded and attentive mind gives soreadily ana distinctly that we are wholly freedfrom doubx about that which we understand . 24
Doney and Frankfurt might wish to claim Descartes' use of
'the phrase 'readily and distinctly' here suggests that he
identifies intuition and clear and distinct perception.
Even if we take the phrase 'readily and distinctly'
in it to be synonymous with the phrase 'clearly and dis-
tinctly', this passage at best suggests that Descartes takes
clear and distinct perception to be a necessary condition
of intuition. His definition becomes that to intuit a
proposition is to perceive it clearly and distinctly in
such a way that we are wholly freed from doubt about it.
Moreover, Descartes claims clear and distinct per-
ception is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of
intuition. Elsewhere in the Rules
,
he writes:
two things are requisite for mental intuition.
Firstly, the proposition intuited must be
clear and distinct; secondly, it must be grasp-
ed in its totality at the same time and not
successively
.
Descartes presents two necessary conditions for his intui-
tion of a proposition. To intuit a proposition he must
clearly and distinctly perceive it and he must grasp all
24
^ Ibid
. ,
?.
25 Ibid.
, 33 .
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its parts at once. It is admittedly unclear how we are
to understand this second condition. Nonetheless, Descartes'
statement strongly suggests he does not identify intuition
and clear and distinct perception.
A second argument can be drawn from statements by
Frankfurt and Kenny. They regard Descartes as identifying
his clear and distinct perception of a proposition with
his perception of it by the natural light. 26 They also
present textual evidence to show that Descartes believes
his perception of a proposition by the natural light im-
plies his metaphysical certainty of it. 22 They might then
present the following argument. There is textual evidence
for attributing to Descartes*.
(28) If S perceives p by the natural light at
t, p is metaphysically certain for S at t.
Since Descartes identifies his perception of a proposition
by the natural light with his clear and distinct perception
of it, his acceptance of (28) commits him to (9). We are
justified, therefore, in attributing (9) to him.
Descartes does identify his clear and distinct per-
ception of a proposition with his perception of it by the
2 6
Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,”
Descartes : A Collection of Critical Essays
,
212. Kenny,
Descartes
,
178.
27Frankfurt, "Descartes' Validation of Reason,"
Descartes ; A Collection of Critical Essays , 212. Kenny,
Descartes
,
1 77-1 7$ .
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natural light. In Part I of the Principles
, he restates
his argument from the Third and Fourth Meditation
. in
doing so he presents his conclusion that all his clear and
distinct perceptions are true, hut he rephrases it as the
conclusion that:
the light of nature
,
or the faculty of know-ledge which God has given to us, can never dis-
close any object which is not true, inasmuch asit comprehends it, that is, inasmuch as it ap-prehends it clearly and distinctly . 28
By stating his conclusion in this way, Descartes seems to
identify his clear and distinct perception of a proposition
with his perception of it by the natural light.
Descartes does not accept (28), however. To show that
he does so, Frankfurt and Kenny cite the passage:
When I say that I am so instructed by nature, I
merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination
which impels me
.
to believe in this connection, and
not a natural light which makes me recognize that
it is true. But, these two things are very dif-
ferent; for I cannot doubt that which the natural
light causes me to believe to be true, as for
example
,
it has shown me that I am from the fact
that I doubt, or other facts of the same kind.
And I possess no other faculty whereby to dis-
tinguish truth from falsehood, which can teach
me that what this light shows me to be true
really is not true, and no other faculty that
is equally trustworthy .29
Descartes states here that he cannot doubt propositions that
the natural light causes him to believe. To Frankfurt and
p o
Haldane and Ross, I, 231.
29Ibid.
,
160-161.
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Kenny, he is claiming to be metaphysically certain of any
proposition he perceives by the natural light.
However, on at least one plausible interpretation of
this passage, Descartes does not assert (28). in stating
that he cannot doubt propositions that the natural light
causes him to believe, Descartes is not claiming to be
metaphysically certain of any proposition he perceives by
that faculty. Instead, he is claiming to be metaphysically
certain of some of the propositions he perceives by it.
The ones he has in mind are the propositions he perceives
in such a way that he intuits them.
We have seen Descartes regards his intuition of a
proposition as involving his clear and distinct perception
of it and, so, his perception of it by the natural light.
As examples of the propositions that interest him here,
Descartes presents the one that his doubting implies his
existence and refers us to other ones "of the same kind."
In the Principles
,
he states that the proposition that his
doubting implies his existence is a common notion and in
the Rules he claims to be able to intuit common notions. 3G
Finally
,
in the first sentence of this passage Descartes
writes of his recognizing propositions to be true by the
natural light rather than of his perceiving them by that
faculty . He elsewhere characterizes intuition by saying
3 °Ibid
.
, 239, 41 & 42.
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that to intuit a proposition is to recognize its truth . 31
Furthermore, another passage strongly suggests that
Descartes rejects ( 9 ).
But when I took anything very simple and easy inthe sphere of arithmetic or geometry into con-
sideration, e.g. that two and three together madefive, and other things of the sort, were not thesepresent to my mind so clearly as to enable me to
that they were true? Certainly, if Ijudged that since such matters could be doubted,
this would not have been for any other reason
than that it came into my mind that perhaps aGod might have endowed me with such a nature
that I may be deceived even concerning things
which seemed to me most manifest. But every
time that this preconceived opinion of the sov-
ereign power of a God presents itself to my
thought, I am
_ constrained to confess that it is
easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to
err, even in matters in which I believe myself
to have the best evidence. 32
Descartes considers an earlier situation in which he clearly
and distinctly perceived the proposition that two and three
equal five. He claims he was not metaphysically certain
of that proposition despite his clear and distinct per-
ception of it. The hypothesis that God is a deceiver pro-
vided him with a reason to doubt it.
Any interpretation that attributes (9) to Descartes,
therefore, is open to the objection that there is no strong
textual evidence for doing so, but there is textual evidence
against doing so.
31 Ibid . , II, 38 .
32 Ibid .
,
I, 158.
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Now let us consider the objection that in attributing
( 9 ) to Descartes, an interpretation loses its ability to
explain adequately one of his most important claims. This
claim has already been considered with regard to the theories
of Frankfurt and Kenny. At the risk of being redundant, it
is best to present it here by again extracting it from
Descartes’ statements.
In the Third Meditation
. Descartes considers the prop-
osition that God exists and the one that God is not a de-
ce iver
:
without a knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything. 33
He believes that until he knows that God exists and is not
a deceiver, he cannot be certain of any other propositions.
In the Fifth Meditation
, he writes:
And so I clearly recognize that the certainty
and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the
knowledge of the true God, in so much that,
before I knew Him, I could not have a perfect
knowledge of any other thing. 3^
His position gets a little more involved with this passage.
He claims that until he knows God exists and is not a de-
ceiver, he cannot be certain of any other proposition in a
way that is required for perfect knowledge.
Descartes also has this claim in mind in the Principles .
33Ibid . , 159-
34Ibid . , I85.
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He writes there that the mind "can have no certain knowledge
until it is acquainted with its creator ." 33
He modifies his position, however, in his reply to the
~
eCOnd
— —
Objections
. He responds to the objection that
his position contradicts his claim to have perfect knowledge
of his existence in the Second Meditation.
when I said that we could know nothing with cer-tainty unless we were first aware that God existed,
announced in express terms that I referred onlyto the science apprehending such conclusions as£^n recur in memory without attend ing further~to
the proofs which led me to make them . Further,knowledge of first principles is not usually
called science by dialecticians. But, when webecome aware that we are thinking beings, this
is a primitive act of knowledge derived from
no. syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I
think
,
hence I m or exist . ' does not deduce
existence from thought by a syllogism, but by
a simple act of. mental vision, recognizes it as
if it were a thing that is known per se
.
3b
Descartes changes his position. He claims he can have per-
fect knowledge of some propositions without knowing that
God exists and is not a deceiver.
Some commentators have argued that we should disregard
this change in Descartes' position . 33 Whether or not we do
so, the other passages show Descartes accepts:
(29) Some true propositions are such that until
33Ibid
. ,
224.
36Ibid . , II, 38 .
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^'For example, see Alan Gewirth's, "The Cartesian
Circle," Philosophical Review
, 50, 4 (July 1941), 370-395-
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S knows that God exists and is not a deceiver
S is not certain of them in a way that is re-quired if S is to have perfect knowledge ofthem
.
Whether or not Descartes believes some true propositions
fail to satisfy (29) is not important at this point.
What is important is that (29) plays an important role
in his understanding of his task. He believes that in ac-
complishing his task he comes to know that God exists and
is not a deceiver. Given this and his belief in ( 29 ), he
claims the accomplishment of his task leads him to satisfy
a necessary condition for having perfect knowledge of prop-
ositions of a particular sort.
Yet, we cannot adequately explain (29) if we ascribe
(9) to Descartes. There are only two ways to explaining
the notion of certainty involved in it, and if we ascribe
(9) to Descartes, neither of these is successful.
The first is to take the notion of certainty involved
in (29) to be that of metaphysical certainty. On its own,
this suggestion is very promising. It is plausible that
metaphysical certainty is a necessary condition of perfect
knowledge . It is also plausible that there are true prop-
ositions of which an individual cannot be metaphysically
certain until he knows God exists and is not a deceiver.
It may be that until he has this knowledge, the hypothesis
of a deceptive god provides him with a reason to doubt them.
We encounter a serious difficulty if we explain (29)
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in this way and attribute (9) to Descartes. In explaining
(29) in this way, we commit Descartes to the claim that he
is metaphysically uncertain of the propositions that satisfy
(29) until he knows that God exists and is not a deceiver.
In attributing (9) to Descartes, we commit him to the claim
that prior to knowing that God exists and is not a deceiver,
he is metaphysically certain of any proposition he clearly
and distinctly perceives. Descartes maintains a claim
that is inconsistent with these. This is that he clearly
and distinctly perceives propositions that satisfy ( 29 )
before he knows that God exists and is not a deceiver.
He makes this last claim in a number of places.
Thus, for example, when I consider the nature of
of a (rectilinear) triangle, I who have some
little knowledge of the principles of geometry
recognize quite clearly that the three angles
are equal to two right angles, and it is not
possible for me not to believe this so long as
I apply my mind to its demonstration; but so
soon as I abstain from attending to the proof,
although I still recollect having clearly com-
prehended it, it may easily occur that I come
to doubt its truth, if I am ignorant of there
being a God ....
But after I have recognized that there
is a God . . . although I no longer pay any at-
tention to the reasons for which I have judged
this [that the angles of a triangle equal two
right angles] to be true, provided that I recol-
lect having clearly and distinctly perceived it
no contrary reason can be brought forward which
could ever cause me to doubt of its truth; and
thus I have a true and certain knowledge of it.-5
-^Haldane and Ross, I, 184.
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In these two paragraphs, Descartes contrasts an epistemic
state in which he lacks perfect knowledge of the theorem
that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles due
to his ignorance of God with one in which he knows God and
has perfect knowledge of that theorem. He thus regards the
theorem as satisfying (29). In the first paragraph, he
claims he clearly and distinctly perceives it even though
he is ignorant of God's existence and nondeceptive nature.
Further textual evidence is provided by Doscartes'
discussion of an atheist's epistemic abilities. He considers
Mersenne's statement that:
while an Atheist knows clearly and distinctly
that the three angles of a triangle are equal to
two right angles, yet he is far from believing
in the existence of God. . . .39
He replies:
That an atheist can know clearly that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to two right
angles
,
I do not deny, I merely affirm that, on
the other hand, such knowledge on his part cannot
constitute true science, because no knowledge that
can be rendered doubtful should be called science.
Since he is, as supposed, an Atheist, he cannot
be sure that he is not deceived in the things
that seem most evident to him, as has been suf-
ficiently shown; and though perchance the doubt
does not occur to him, nevertheless, it may come
up if he examines the matter, or if another sug-
gest it; he can never be safe from it unless he
first recognizes the existence of a God.40
39 Ibid . , II, 26.
40 x , . ,Ibid
.
,
39
•
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Descartes claims that an atheist lacks perfect knowledge of
the theorem at hand because his ignorance of God keeps him
from being certain of it in a way required for perfect know-
ledge. He therefore believes the theorem satisfies (29).
He admits, though, that the atheist clearly and distinctly
perceives the theorem.
There is, of course, another way of explaining the
notion of certainty involved in ( 29 ). We can take it to
be some notion other than that of metaphysical certainty
which allows for a philosophically plausible reading of
( 29 ) .
It is doubtful, however, that such a notion can be
extracted from Descartes' writings. Of the commentators
we have considered, only Kenny has attempted to do so, and
he has failed. Moreover, on this alternative, we again
encounter a serious difficulty if we ascribe (9) to
Descartes
.
Suppose we take the notion of certainty involved in
( 29 ) to be other than that of metaphysical certainty and
call this new sort of certainty ' C -certainty '
. However
else Descartes understands C-certainty, he takes it to be
a necessary condition of perfect knowledge. For this reason,
he regards it as being implied by metaphysical certainty.
He writes:
To begin with, directly we think we rightly per-
ceive something, we spontaneously persuade our-
selves that it is true. Further, if this con-
viction is so strong that we have no reason to
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doubt concerning that of the truth of which wehave persuaded ourselves, there is nothing moreto inquire about; we have here all the certaintythat can be reasonably desired. ... We have
*
assumed
. a conviction so strong that nothing can
remove it, and this persuasion is clearlv the
same as perfect certitude. 4l
Descartes asserts that if an individual does not have any
reason to doubt a proposition, he has all the certainty re
garding i o he can reasonably desire. He states that such
an individual has perfect certainty of the proposition.
According to Descartes, then, once an individual is meta-
physically certain of a proposition he has all the certainty
he requires for perfect knowledge of it. He thus regards
metaphysical certainty as implying C-certainty.
Given this, the ascription of (9) to him commits
Descartes to the claim that his clear and distinct per-
ceptions are always C-certain. Our explanation of ( 29 )
commits him to the claim that he is not C-certain of the
propositions that satisfy it until he knows that God exists
and is not a deceiver. These two claims are inconsistent
with his already well-documented view that he clearly and
distinctly perceives some of the propositions that satisfy
(29) before knowing of God's existence and nondeceptive
nature
.
If we attribute (9) to Descartes, then, we cannot
41
Ibid.
,
41.
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adequately explain ( 29 ). If we do not attribute (9) to him,
however, there is a good chance we can do so on the first
alternative. We can take the notion of certainty involved
in it to be that of metaphysical certainty and interpret
it as asserting that until an individual knows God exists
and is not a deceiver, he is metaphysically uncertain of
some true propositions. He is metaphysically uncertain of
them, because the hypothesis that God is a deceiver provides
him with a reason to doubt them despite his clear and dis-
tinct perception of them.
Due to these objections, it is highly doubtful that
my questions can be correctly answered by an interpretation
that attributes (9) to Descartes. In the next chapter, I
shall begin considering interpretations that do not do so.
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CHAPTER III
Having rejected the view that Descartes accepts (9),
a new line of interpretation is open to us According to
this one, Descartes believes some propositions are such that
his clear and distinct perception of them is insufficient
to make them metaphysically certain for him. However, his
clearly and distinctly perceiving them and his satisfying
some further condition are sufficient to do so. His task
is to attain a state in which he satisfies that further
condition, and he believes that once he does so, he is
metaphysically certain of any proposition he clearly and
distinctly perceives. He denies though that he becomes
metaphysically certain of some of his clear and distinct
perceptions in order to accomplish his task.
In the next two chapters, I shall consider three ver-
sions of this line of interpretation. I shall show that
each of them fails to answer my questions correctly. Then
I will argue that no version of this line of interpretation
can correctly answer those questions.
1. The first interpretation is Alan Gewirth's. 1 He gives
1 Alan Gewirth, "The Cartesian Circle," Philosophical
Review, 50 , 4, (July 1941), 370-395* Alan Gewirth, "The
Cartesian Circle Reconsidered," Journal of Philosophy , 67,
19 ( 1970 ), 668-684. Alan Gewirth, "Descartes: Two Disputed
Questions," Journal of Philosophy , 68, 18 (1971), 288-296.
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the following response to (1). Descartes believes his clear
and distinct perceptions are always psychologically certain,
but that some propositions are such that his clear and dis-
tinct perception of them is insufficient to make them meta-
physically certain. However, his clearly and distinctly per
ceiving these propositions and its being impossible that the
hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct are
su^^ c t en t to make them metaphysically certain. His task
is to attain a state in which the latter condition holds.
With regard to (2), Gewirth claims Descartes attempts
to accomplish his task by clearly and distinctly perceiving
that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is not clear
and distinct. In response to (3), he claims that, while
Descartes attempt may be open to other objections, it is
not open to Arnauld's.
2. Gewirth's answer to (1) consists of the claim:
( 30 ) Descartes believes his clear and distinct
perceptions are always psychologically
certain for him. 2
(31) Descartes believes that in his initial po-
sition some propositions are metaphysically
uncertain for him despite his clear and
distinct perception of them. 3
(32) Descartes takes on the task of attaining
a state in which it is impossible that
the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is
clear and distinct.
2Gewirth, Philosophical Review
, 50, 4 , 390.
^Ibid .
,
386.
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(3°) is straightforward and correct. We have seen that
Descartes accepts (21), and his doing so commits him to the
position ascribed to him by ( 30 ).
(31) is also correct. Descartes believes some of his
clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically uncertain
for him in his initial position. Upon completing his task
in the Principles
. he writes:
And this should deliver us from that supreme
doubt which encompassed us when we did not know
whether or not our nature had been such that
we had been deceived in things that seemed most
clear. It should also protect us against all the
other
_ reasons already mentioned which we had for
doubting. The truths of mathematics should now
be above suspicion, for they are of the clearest.
And . if we perceive anything by our senses, either
waking or sleeping, if it is clear and distinct,
and if we separate it from what is obscure and
confused, we shall easily assure ourselves of
what is the truth.
According to Descartes, the accomplishment of his task places
him in an epistemic state in which all his clear and distinct
perceptions are metaphysically certain. This suggests he
believes his initial position is not such a state.
( 32
)
,
however, needs to be clarified, and once clarified,
it is clearly incorrect. Gewirth does not explicitly state
( 32 ), but it can be extracted from some of his statements.
He claims Descartes thinks his metaphysical uncertainty of
his clear and distinct perceptions in his initial position
stems from the fact that he has a reason to doubt them, and
4
Ibid.
, 159.
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that
:
The content of this reason is, of course, the
"opinion" that there may be an omnipotent God
who is a deceiver .-5
Gewirth interprets Descartes as believing the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver is the only one that casts doubt on
his clear and distinct perceptions in his initial position.
Gewirth also claims that in regarding that hypothesis
as casting doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions,
Descartes regards it, not as being,
metaphysically certain or true, but as psycholog-
ically cogent because possibly clear and distinct . 6
He amplifies this point elsewhere.
Nonetheless, however paradoxical it may appear,
the rationality and cogency of the "reason" on
which the doubt is based can consist only in
its purported clearness and distinctness. This
does not mean that the reason of the doubt is
in fact clear and distinct (the refutation of
it will consist in showing that it is not) but
simply that its cogency and its ability to
function in the argument derive to it from the
fact that it is thought to be at least pos-
sibly possessed of these qualities .'7
Stated roughly, his position seems to be this. Descartes
thinks the hypothesis that God is a deceiver provides him
with a reason for doubting only so long as it is possibly
clear and distinct. More generally, he accepts the prin-
ciple :
^Gewirth, Philosophical Review , 50 , 4, 385 .
6 Ibid .
,
392.
7 Ibid
.
,
391.
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(33) P is a reason for S to doubt q at t onlyif p is possibly clear and distinct at t.
this principle and his belief that the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver is the only one that casts doubt
on his clear and distinct perceptions, Descartes decides
two conditions are jointly sufficient for his metaphysical
certainty of a proposition. They are that he clearly and
distinctly perceive the proposition and that it be impos-
sible that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear
and distinct. He takes on the task of attaining a state
in which the latter condition holds, believing that once
he does so, all his clear and distinct perceptions will
be metaphysically certain for him.
In effect, this is the position asserted by (32), and
it needs to be clarified further. It is not clear how we
are to understand the notion of possibility involved in (33)
Nor is it clear how we are to understand the notion of a
proposition's being clear and distinct. Up to now, we have
only been concerned with clarity and distinctness as prop-
erties of perceptual acts.
Gewirth provides three candidates for the notion of
possibility involved in (32)
.
The first is logical possibil
ity
.
The second and third are definable in terms of meta-
physical and psychological certainty. With regard to meta-
physical certainty we can define:
(34) p is metaphysically possible for S at t =df.
-p is not metaphysically certain for S at t
.
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(35) P is metaphysically impossible for S at t =df
-p is metaphysically certain for S at t
.
A proposition is metaphysically possible just in case we
have a reason to doubt its negation. It is metaphysically
impossible just in case we do not have such a reason.
In terms of psychological certainty we can define:
(35) p is psychologically possible for S at t =df.
-p is not psychologically certain for S at t
.
(37) p is psychologically impossible for S at t =df.
-p is psychologically certain for S at t
.
A proposition is psychologically possible if and only if we
are able to refrain from affirming its negation. It is
psychologically impossible if and only if we cannot refrain
from doing so.
Gewirth has psychological, rather than logical or
metaphysical, possibility in mind when he presents ( 33 ).
Logical possibility is ruled out because he regards Descartes
as trying to go from a state in which it is possible that
the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct
to one in which it is not. Descartes does not have any way
of altering the fact that it is logically possible that the
hypothesis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct.
Metaphysical possibility is ruled out by Gewirth' s claim
that Descartes wants to satisfy a condition that does not
involve his being metaphysically certain of a proposition he
g
clearly and distinctly perceives. The condition that it be
8
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,
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metaphysically impossible for him that the hypothesis that
God is a deceiver is clear and distinct involves his being
metaphysically certain of such a proposition. It involves
his being metaphysically certain that the hypothesis that
God is a deceiver is not clear and distinct, and Gewirth
claims Descartes clearly and distinctly perceives that fact.
Only psychological possibility is left. Descartes has
a way of altering the fact that it is psychologically pos-
sible for him that the hypothesis is clear and distinct. His
clear and distinct perception that it is not clear and dis-
tinct will do the trick. The condition that it be psycho-
logically impossible for him that the hypothesis is clear
and distinct does not involve his being metaphysically cer-
tain of any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.
We still have to see what it is for a proposition to
be clear and distinct. Some, though not too much, light is
shed upon this point by Gewirth 's statement:
The most general level at which ideas and per-
ceptive acts are clear and distinct is that at
which the idea, directly and explicitly present
to a mind which is explicitly "attending" to it,
is "open" to the mind in the sense that the mind
fully recognizes the meaning contained in the idea,
and does not attribute any other meaning to the
idea. Since a mind which has full insight into
the contents of its ideas will have removed whatever
inconsistencies such insight might have revealed,
clearness and distinctness as logical qualities
mean complete consistence and coherence within
and among ideas.
9
9 Ibid
.
,
371.
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According to Gewirth, when an individual clearly and dis-
tinctly perceives a proposition, he apprehends it in a parti-
cular way. To be a potential object of such apprehension,
a proposition must meet certain requirements. It is clear
and distinct just in case it meets those requirements
.
Principle (3*0. therefore, can be restated more clear-
ly as:
( 38 ) p is a reason for S to doubt q at t only if
it is psychologically possible for S at t
that p is clear and distinct.
Gewirth 's claim in (32) is that Descartes wants to make it
psychologically impossible for himself that the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct.
Understood in this way, however, (32) is incorrect.
Principle ( 38 ) is very implausible, and Gewirth fails to
provide any textual evidence to support his ascription of it
to Descartes. To appreciate the implausibility of ( 38 ),
consider this. Suppose Descartes clearly and distinctly
perceives that the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles, but he is metaphysically uncertain of that theorem.
The hypothesis that God is a deceiver provides him with his
only reason to doubt it, and it is psychologically possible
for him that that hypothesis is clear and distinct. More-
over, the only thing preventing Descartes from having per-
fect knowledge of the theorem is his metaphysical uncertain-
ty of it.
A few moments later, Descartes' psychological state
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changes
. He still clearly and distinctly perceives the
theorem, but, by clear and distinct perception, he is psy-
chologically certain the hypothesis that God is a deceiver
is not clear and distinct. Assuming (38) is true, Descartes
is now metaphysically certain of the theorem and has perfect
knowledge of it.
If (38) is true, then, Descartes' becoming psycholog-
ically certain that the hypothesis that God deceives him
is not clear and distinct takes him from a state in which
he does not have perfect knowledge of the theorem to one
in which he does. This is very implausible. In becoming
psychologically certain that the hypothesis is not clear
and distinct, Descartes does not acquire any new evidence
for the theorem. Nor does he obtain any evidence ruling
out the possibility that God deceives him by having him
clearly and distinctly perceive the theorem and the proposi-
tion that the hypothesis is not clear and distinct, although
they are both false. Descartes simply becomes very con-
vinced that the hypothesis is not clear and distinct. It
is very doubtful that this change in his psychological state
takes him from the position in which he lacks perfect know-
ledge of the theorem to one in which he has it.
Furthermore, Gewirth fails to present any textual
evidence that supports his ascription of (38) to Descartes.
He claims that:
This point (that Descartes accepts( 38 )) is con-
firmed not only by the many passages in which
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Descartes says that his metaphysical doubt rests
on reasons, but also by the passages where he
characterizes his method of doubt, including hishypothesis that God is a deceiver, in terms of
clearness and distinctness .! 0
There are passages in which Descartes claims he is meta-
physically certain of a proposition only if he does not have
a reason to doubt it. However, Descartes does not present
(38) in them. While Gewirth cites two passages in which
Descartes considers the role of clarity and distinctness
in his method of doubt, neither of them supports his as-
cription of ( 38 ) to Descartes.
The first is Descartes' statement that:
one may pretend that God is a deceiver--even
the true God, but such that he is not known
sufficiently clearly either to oneself or to
the persons for whose sake one forms this
hypothesis .
According to Gewirth:
Here, in saying that the true God, who of course
is not a deceiver, was "not known sufficiently
clearly" when the hypothesis of a deceiving God
was set up, Descartes is obviously suggesting
that the proposition that God is a deceiver was
thought to be possibly clear and distinct at
that point in the argument . 12
Gewirth is reading a lot into Descartes' statement. Descartes
seems to assert that when the hypothesis that God is a de-
ceiver provides him with a reason for doubting, he does not
10Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy , 68 , 18, 291.
^Adam and Tannery, IV, 64. This is Gewirth's trans-
lation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
1
^Gewirth, Journal of Philosophy , 68 , 18, 292.
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know God clearly. However, his point may simply be that
at such ct time he does not clearly end distinctly perceive
some propositions that correctly characterize God's nature.
Nothing in his statement suggests he maintains that at such
a time he is psychologically uncertain of whether the hypoth-
esis that God is a deceiver is clear and distinct.
The second passage is Descartes' statement:
I [oried t0 discover the
of the propositions which
feeble conjectures but by
reasonings A 3
falsity or uncertainty
I examined, not by
clear and assured
Gewirth claims that:
Since the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is
one of the "reasonings" by which Descartes tries
tc test the certainty of his propositions, it
fellows that he regards that hypothesis as at
least tentatively or possibly clear and distinct.
Once again, he reads a great deal into Descartes' statement.
In writing of clear and assured reasonings, Descartes may
be thinking of the arguments he presents to show that a
particular hypothesis provides him with a reason for doubt-
ing, and be claiming that he clearly and distinctly perceives
the premises of those arguments. If he is, he is not commit-
ting himself to ( 38 ). Even if we join Gewirth in interpret-
ing Descartes as referring to his reasons for doubting when
^Adam and Tannery, IV, 29. This is Gewirth' s trans-
lation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
liTGewirth, Journal of Philosophy , 68 , 18, 292.
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he writes of clear and assured reasonings, he is not as-
serting ( 38 ). He is claiming that a proposition must be
clear and distinct to provide him with a reason for doubting.
Gewirth, himself, denies Descartes makes that claim.
Gewirth's answer to ( 1 ), therefore, is incorrect. It
attributes a very implausible principle to Descartes when
there is no textual evidence for doing so
.
2. Gewirth also fails to answer (2) correctly. He states
that to accomplish his task, Descartes tries to show,
by means of clear and distinct perception, not
that the proposition "a veracious God exists"
is true in the metaphysical sense or that the
ratio of there being an omnipotent God who
falsifies all clear and distinct perception is
metaphysically false, but that the former is
clear and distinct, while the latter is con-
fused or contradictory, and hence irrational in
the very respect in which it had previously been
regarded as valid. And this in fact is what is
accomplished in the first instance by Descartes'
demonstration of the existence and veracity of God. ^
Gewirth's answer seems to be this. Descartes tries to ac-
complish his task by clearly and distinctly perceiving
that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is not clear
and distinct. He believes his clear and distinct perception
of that fact will make him psychologically certain of it,
placing him in the epistemic state he desires.
There is no textual evidence for this interpretation
of Descartes' argument. Gewirth does not cite any passages
15Gewirth, Philosophical Review
, 50, 4, 393 .
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in which Descartes concludes that the hypothesis is not
clear and distinct, and there do not appear to be any.
The relevant part of Descartes' argument is:
And the whole strength of the argument which I havemade use of to prove the existence of God consistsin this, that I recognize that it is not possible"that my nature should be what it is, and indeedthat I should have in myself the idea of God, ifGod did not veritably exist— a God, I say, whoseidea is in me
,
i.e. who possesses all those su-preme perfections of which our mind may indeed
have
. some idea but without understanding them all,
who is liable to no error or defect (and who has
none of all those marks which denote imperfection)
From this it is manifest that he cannot be a de-
ceiver, since the light of nature teaches us that
fraud an£ deception necessarily proceed from some
defect
.
lc
Descartes claims the conclusion that God is not a deceiver
is made manifest by the natural light; so, he may believe
he clearly and distinctly perceives it. He does not, how-
©ver
,
claim that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver is
not clear and distinct, or that he clearly and distinctly
perceives that it is not clear and distinct.
3. With regard to ( 3 ), Gewirth gives an interesting response
to Arnauld's objection.
. . . Descartes' argument is not circular, for
while it is by the psychological certainty of
clear and distinct perceptions that God's
existence is proved, what God guarantees is the
metaphysical certainty of such perceptions
.
1 ^
1
^Haldane and Ross, I, 171.
1
"^Gewirth, Philosophical Review, 5°» ^ 386.
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A more detailed version of his response seems to be the fol-
lowing. Some of Descartes' critics have understood him to
claim that until he accomplishes his task he is metaphysi-
cally uncertain of any proposition he clearly and distinctly
perceives. They have also attributed to him the claim that
to accomplish his task, he becomes metaphysically certain
of some of those propositions
. Interpreting Descartes in
this way, they have objected that his attempt is successful
only if he has already accomplished his task when he makes
it. They have misinterpreted Descartes, however. He does
not claim that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysi-
cally certain of some propositions he clearly and distinctly
perceives. He claims that to do so, he need only become
psychologically certain the hypothesis that God is a de-
ceiver is not clear and distinct. He is able to do this
without having accomplished his task.
This response to Arnauld is unsuccessful, of course.
Descartes does not attempt to accomplish his task by becom-
ing psychologically certain the hypothesis that God is a
deceiver is not clear and distinct. However, Gewirth's
idea that we can meet Arnauld 's objection by claiming
Descartes' attempt does not involve his becoming meta-
physically certain of some of his clear and distinct per-
ceptions has seemed promising to some philosophers. They
have tried to construct interpretations that will allow
them to give this response and correctly answer my
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questions. Let us consider one such attempt to improve upon
Gewirth ' s the ory
.
4. This attempt is Willis Doney's. 16 Forsaking the inter-
pretation considered in Chapter I, he has formulated one
in which Descartes does not accept (9). With regard to
question (1), he interprets Descartes as believing that some
propositions are such that his clearly and distinctly per-
ceiving them is insufficient to make them metaphysically
certain. However, his clearly and distinctly perceiving
them and his being able to correctly reject as question
begging any plausible argument for the conclusion that he
has a reason to doubt his clear and distinct perceptions are
sufficient to make him metaphysically certain of them. Ac-
cording to Doney, Descartes' task is to attain a state in
which he satisfies the latter condition.
In response to (2), Doney claims that Descartes at-
tempts to accomplish his task by clearly and distinctly
perceiving he is a creation of God who is not a deceiver.
With regard to (3), Doney claims that Descartes' attempt
is not open to Amauld's charge of circularity.
5. Doney' s answer to (1) is given by:
(39) Descartes believes some of his clear and
distinct perceptions are metaphysically
uncertain for him in his initial position.
1
^Willis Doney, "Descartes' Conception of Perfect
Knowledge," Journal of the History of Philosophy , 8, 4
(1970), 387-403.
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(40) Descartes
.wants to attain a state in whichany plau s ible argument for the conclusion'that he has
. a reason to doubt some of hisclear and distinct perceptions begs thequestion against him.
While Doney does not explicitly present ( 39 ), it is a reason
able interpretation of some of his statements. He tells us
R is a proposition Descartes clearly and distinctly per-
ceives but of which he does not have perfect knowledge in
his initial position.
it is clear what conditions must be satisfiedif a person is to have perfect knowledge of
propositions like R. (1) He must at some time,
pas l or present, attend to a demonstration andhave a clear and distinct perception. (2) Ifhis clear and distinct perception is in the
Past, he must remember having had such a per-
ception. Finally, ( 3 ) when he remembers hav-
ing had a clear and distinct perception, there
can be no reason for doubting that the proposi-
tion in question is true.
. . .
His (Descartes')
contention in terms of this analysis is that the
third condition cannot be satisfied. *9
According to Doney, Descartes adopts three necessary condi-
tions for perfect knowledge and claims that in his initial
position some of his clear and distinct perceptions fail to
satisfy the last one.
Doney' s statement of these conditions is very unclear,
however; particularly his statement of the last one. The
first condition is that the individual must clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive the proposition or have done so in the
past. The second is that if the individual does not clearly
and distinctly perceive the proposition, he must remember
19Ibid
.
,
390
.
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having done so. The third condition seems to be that the
proposition must be metaphysically certain for the indivi-
dual when he remembers clearly and distinctly perceiving it.
However, this seems to assume that the individual remembers
clearly and distinctly perceiving the proposition. The
other conditions do not imply that he does sos he satisfies
them if he simply clearly and distinctly perceives the prop-
osition
.
We might take Doney's third condition to be that the
individual must be metaphysically certain of the proposition
if he remembers clearly and distinctly perceiving it; but
this cannot be correct. Descartes can satisfy this require-
ment in his initial position with regard to any proposition
he clearly and distinctly perceives. All he has to do is
refrain from remembering that he has clearly and distinctly
perceived it. Doney
,
however, attributes to Descartes the
claim that in his initial position he is unable to satisfy
the third condition with regard to some of his clear and
distinct perceptions
. He surely wants us to understand
this condition so that that claim is plausible
.
Another way of understanding this condition is as the
requirement that at some later time the individual must
remember clearly and distinctly perceiving the proposition
and be metaphysically certain of it. However, this require-
ment is too implausible to be the one Doney wants to ascribe
to Descartes. An individual's having perfect knowledge of
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a proposition is obviously not contingent upon his later
remembering having clearly and distinctly perceived it.
The most plausible way of understanding this condition
is as the requirement that the proposition must be meta-
physically certain for the individual. The first two
conditions then insure that the individual either clearly
and distinctly perceives the proposition or correctly re-
members having done so. The third one insures that in
either case the proposition is metaphysically certain for
him. When the third condition is understood in this way,
Doney s claim that Descartes believes he does not satisfy
it with regard to some of his clear and distinct perceptions
amounts to (39). We have seen that ( 39 ) is correct.
But what about (40)
,
the other part of Doney' s answer?
Upon examination it is clear that (40) is incorrect. Like
(39), it can be extracted from some of Doney ' s statements.
Doney says V is the proposition that Descartes is a creation
of God who is not a deceiver, and states that according to
Descartes
,
His (Descartes') clear and distinct perception of
V provides him with what he lacked before, that
is, a way of rejecting the only arguments that
can be proposed to show that his faculty of rea-
soning may not be reliable. . . . Mot only does
he clearly and distinctly perceive V, but he is
in a position to reject the only arguments that
a sceptic can produce to question his certainty,
and there can be no reason for doubt . 20
2 QIbid.
,
402.
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Doney's position seems to be this. Descartes believes some
of his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically
uncertain for him in his initial position. He thinks he
metaphysically certain of them, however, if he
clearly and distinctly perceives them and is able correctly
to reject any plausible argument for the conclusion that
some of his clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically
uncertain for him. Descartes tries to satisfy the latter
condition by clearly and distinctly perceiving V.
Doney's position is clarified further by his statement
that "on the interpretation proposed, the theist rejects
the sceptic's arguments on the grounds that, presenting
arguments of this sort, he necessarily begs the question."^ 1
He, thus, attributes to Descartes:
(41) If S clearly and distinctly perceives p
at t and any plausible argument for the
conclusion that S has a reason to doubt
some of his clear and distinct perceptions
at t begs the question against S at t,
then S is metaphysically certain of p at t
.
According to Doney, Descartes wants to exchange his initial
position for one in which he satisfies the second condition
in the antecedent of (4l) and, so, is metaphysically certain
of all his clear and distinct perceptions. In effect,
this is what (40) asserts.
However, Doney does not cite any passages in which
Descartes presents (4l), and there do not appear to be any.
21 md.
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(4l) is too implausible to be correctly attributed to Descartes
in the absence of such evidence
. Doney admits that some of
Descartes 1 clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically
uncertain for him in his initial position. Descartes'
attaining a state in which every plausible argument for the
conclusion that he has a reason to doubt some of his clear
and distinct perceptions begs the question against him
obviously does not change this. The fact that an individual
can reject an argument as question begging does not imply
that its conclusion is false. Descartes might very well be
able to correctly reject every plausible argument for the
conclusion that he has a reason to doubt some of his clear
and distinct perceptions on the grounds that it begs the
question, and still have a reason to doubt some of his clear
and distinct perceptions. Doney' s answer to (1), then, at-
tributes a very implausible position to Descartes when
there is no textual evidence for doing so.
6. His answer to our second question is also unsatisfactory.
He states that Descartes attempts to accomplish his task
by clearly and distinctly perceiving V, that he is a crea-
tion of God who is not a deceiver. Supposedly, Descartes
believes his clear and distinct perception of V places him
in a position in which every plausible argument for the
conclusion that he has a reason to doubt some of his clear
and distinct perceptions begs the question against him.
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To clarify this, Doney attributes to Descartes the
principle that "someone who clearly and distinctly perceives
R thinks that he does have a conclusive reason for believ-
ing R . " 22 This is the principle :
( ) If S clearly and distinctly perceives p
• at t, S believes he is metaphysically
certain of p at t
.
He also ascribes to him: 2 -'
(43) If S believes he is metaphysically certain
of V at t, any plausible argument for the
conclusion that S has a reason to doubt
some of his clear and distinct perceptions
begs the question against S at t
.
Doney does not claim Descartes ever states (42) or (43),
and there do not appear to be any passages in which he
does so. He presents them as plausible principles Descartes
would be willing to accept. They do imply that Descartes'
clear and distinct perception of V places him in the position
he supposedly desires.
It is clear, however, that Descartes would not accept
(43)
•
Doney explains this principle in an attempt to dis-
play its plausibility. Any plausible argument for the con-
clusion that Descartes has a reason to doubt some of his
clear and distinct perceptions presents an hypothesis, H,
which purports to be such a reason and also contains a pre-
mise claiming H is metaphysically possible for Descartes.
Since it is plausible, such an argument presents only
22 Ibid .
,
400.
2
^Ibid
. ,
401-402.
98
hypotheses that are inconsistent with V, such as the one
that Descartes is a creation of a deceptive god and the
one that Descartes has come about by chance. Once Descartes
believes he is metaphysically certain of V, any such argu-
ment begs the question against him. Since H is inconsistent
with V and Descartes believes he is metaphysically certain
of V, he will reject the premise that H is metaphysically
possible
.
On this explanation, however, (43) is too implausible
to be acceptable to Descartes. Even if H is inconsistent
with V, the premise that H is metaphysically possible for
him will not beg the question against Descartes simply
because he believes he is metaphysically certain of V . He
may believe this, but be completely unaware of H and the
fact that H is inconsistent with V. If this is the case,
H is metaphysically possible for him and the premise stat-
ing that fact does not beg the question against him.
7. Like the other commentators we have considered, Doney
takes Arnauld's objection to be the following. Descartes
maintains that until he accomplishes his task none of his
clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain
and that to accomplish the task he becomes metaphysically
certain of some of them. On his own position, therefore,
his attempt is successful only if he has accomplished his
task when he makes his attempt.
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Doneys response is that Descartes does not claim
that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically cer
tain cf some of his clear and distinct perceptions. He
claims that he accomplishes his task by clearly and
distinctly perceiving V and coming to believe that he is
metaphysically certain of it. Given the failure of Doney
answers to (1) and (2), however, it is clear that this re
sponse to Arnauld is unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER IV
In this chapter, I shall consider another attempt to
answer my questions correctly by following the line of in-
terpretation initiated by Gewirth. Then, I shall argue that
that line of interpretation cannot provide us with correct
answers
.
1. The interpretation I shall consider is Fred Feldman's. 1
In response to (1), Feldman interprets Descartes as believ-
ing some propositions are such that his clearly and dis-
tinctly perce i\- ing them is insufficient to make them meta-
physically certain. However, his clearly and distinctly
perceiving them and it being the case that every hypothesis
that would otherwise cast doubt on them is practically im-
possible for him are jointly sufficient to do so. According
to Feldman, Descartes takes on the task of satisfying the
latter condition, believing that once he does so all his
clear and distinct perceptions will be metaphysically cer-
tain .
With regard to (2), Feldman interprets Descartes as
attempting his task by following arguments designed to make
every hypothesis that casts doubt on his clear and distinct
1 Fred, Feldman, "Epistemic Appraisal and the Cartesian
Circle," Phil . Studies
, 27 (1975). 37-55-
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perceptions in his initial position a practical impossibil-
ity for himself. In response to (3), he argues that Descartes'
attempt is not open to Arnauld's objection.
2. On the surface, Feldman's answer to (1) is very similar
to those considered in the last chapter. Like Gewirth and
Doney, he interprets Descartes as believing his clear and
distinct perception of some propositions is insufficient to
make them metaphysically certain. He also interprets Descartes
as trying to satisfy a further condition which together with
his clear and distinct perception implies his metaphysical
certainty of those propositions.
However, Feldman also ventures beyond the answers given
by Gewith and Doney. To explain the condition he thinks
Descartes wants to satisfy, he presents a number of new
notions and principles. This part of his answer merits
careful attention. It is very interesting and plays an
important role in his attempt to answer my questions correct-
ly-
The first concept Feldman introduces is that of practi-
cal certainty. He regards Descartes as presenting this con-
cept and distinguishing it from that of metaphysical cer-
tainty in the passage:
But we must note the distinction emphasized by
me in various passages, between the practical
activities of our life and an inquiry into truth;
for when it is a case of regulating our life, it
would assuredly be stupid not to trust the senses,
and those sceptics were quite ridiculous who so
neglected human affairs that they had to be
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preserved by their friends from tumbling downprecipices. It was for this reason that some-
where I announced that no one in his sound mind
seriously douoted about such matters; but when
we raise an inquiry into what is the surest know-ledge which the human mind can obtain, it is
^
leKiy -, Unreasonable t0 refuse to treat them asdoubtful, nay even to reject them as false, so
as to allow us to become aware that certain otherthings
,
which cannot be thus neglected are forthis very reason more certain, and in actual
truth better known by us/
Descartes claims that while some propositions are sufficient-
ly certain to be accepted for the practical activities of
life, they are not sufficiently certain to be accepted for
what he calls "an inquiry into truth".
It is reasonable to suppose Descartes has metaphysical
certainty in mind in writing of the certainty that is required
for an inquiry into truth. Making this assumption, Feldman
claims Descartes is drawing a distinction between meta-
physical certainty and another kind of certainty. Terming
this other kind of certainty 'practical certainty', he re-
states Descartes' position as being that some propositions
are practically, but not metaphysically, certain for him and
that while such propositions are acceptable under ordinary
circumstances, they are not acceptable for an inquiry into
truth .
^
To clarify this, Feldman explains the notion of pract-
ical certainty.
^Haldane and Ross, II, 206.
-^Feldman, Phil . Studies
, 27, 38 .
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tainty fSfa^rson?^^^ a'time? Cis^s^"roughly, that S is justified in beli^iL n It ton that S has "the
. epistemic right" to bflieve
’
p at t, or that p is either self-evident or ade-quately evidenced for S at t
. There are
?°ip
tS notlce about practical certainty.Foremost among them is that this is a purely
T^ltTth 5°
nCept
’ and not a Psychological one.
+
hat P ls a practical certainty of S at tis not jto say anything about how S feels about
For an individual to be practically certain of a proposition
at a time is for him to be epistemically justified in believ-
ing it at that time
. He may be practically certain of a
proposition with or without feeling convinced of its truth.
With regard to metaphysical certainty, Feldman states:
Roughly, to say that a proposition is a metaphys-!cal certainty for a person is to say that it is
absolutely certain for him--beyond even the mosthyperbolic doubt
. Not even "the very least ground
of suspicion" can be found against it. A pro-position is a metaphysical certainty for a person
at a time only if he is then "maximally justified"in believing it. The requirements for metaphys-ical certainty are thus of the same kind as, but
considerably more stringent than, the requirements
for practical certainty. As in the case of pract-ical certainty, it should perhaps be mentioned that
the concept of metaphysical certainty is an epistemic
concept, and not a psychological one. When we say
that a proposition is a metaphysical certainty for
a person, we are not saying how firmly convinced
he is of it.-5
According to Feldman, for an individual to be metaphysically
certain of a proposition is for him to be maximally justi-
fied in believing it. Not only is he justified in believing
^
Ibid . , 40.
^ Ibid . , 43 .
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it, but he could not be more justified in believing anything
than he is m believing it. He may be metaphysically cer-
tain of a proposition with or without feeling convinced of
its truth.
Clarified in this way, Feldman's interpretation of
the passage before us is very plausible. It is reasonable
to take Descartes to be claiming some propositions are justi-
fied, but not maximally justified, for him, and that as a
result they are acceptable under ordinary circumstances,
but not for an inquiry into truth.
Moreover, Feldman's clarification of Descartes' notions
of practical and metaphysical certainty is correct. It en-
ables us to give a very plausible interpretation, not only
ot the passage before us, but also of Descartes' description
of his epistemic state in the First Meditation
. Descartes
considers what his epistemic state is like at that point
with regard to propositions that are evidenced for him by
his senses, such as the one that he is sitting in front of
a fire
.
For although we have a moral assurance of these
things which is such that it seems that it would
be extravagent in us to doubt them, at the same
time no one, unless he is devoid of reason can
deny, when a metaphysical certainty is in question,
that there is sufficient cause for our not having
complete assurance, by observing the fact that
when asleep we may similarly imagine that we have
another body, and that we see other stars and
another earth, without there being anything of
the kind. fc
^Haldane and Ross, I, 1 04
.
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This suggests he regards the proposition that he is sitting
m front of a fire as being practically, but not metaphys-
ically, certain for him in the First Meditation
.
However, he regards the proposition that he seems to
see light, hear noise and feel heat as being metaphysically
certain for him at that point.
But, it will be said that these phenomena arefalse and that I am dreaming. Let it be so;
still it is at least quite certain that it
seems to me that I see light, that I hear
noise, that I feel heat.?
Feldman s clarification of practical and metaphysical
certainty enables us to understand Descartes' description in
a very plausible fashion. At the beginning of the First
Me di mat ion
,
Descartes has some sense perceptions of a fire.
He seems to see light, hear noise and feel heat. As a result
of these perceptions, he is maximally justified in believing
that he seems to see light, hear noise and feel heat. He
could not be more justified in believing anything than he is
in believing that proposition about what he is experiencing,
and hence he is metaphysically certain of it. His perceptions
also make him practically certain he is sitting in front of
a fire. They provide him with sufficient evidence to justi-
fy his belief he is doing so, but they do not maximally
justify that belief. He is more justified in believing the
proposition about what he is experiencing than he is in
7 Ibid., 153 *
ICr
believing the one about the source of those experiences.
Having successfully clarified the concepts of practical
and metaphysical certainty, Feldman defines some other ones.
Employing the concept of practical certainty, he presents:
(44) p is a practical possibility for S at t =df.
-p is not a practical certainty for S at t.'
(45) p is a practical impossibility for S at t =df.
-p is a practical certainty for S at t
.
(46; p is a practical uncertainty for S at t =df.
p is not a practical certainty for S at t.
These concepts fall into a square of opposition along with
that of practical certainty.
In terms of metaphysical certainty, he defines:
(4?) p is a metaphysical possibility for S at t =df.
-p is not a metaphysical certainty for S at t
.
(48) p is a metaphysical impossibility for S at
t =df.
-p is a metaphysical certainty for S
at t
.
(49) p is a metaphysical uncertainty for S at
t =df. p is not a metaphysical certainty
for S at t.
Like the concept of practical certainty and the ones defined
in terms of it, these concepts and that of metaphysical
certainty fall into a square of opposition.
Feldman's next step is to use these concepts to clari-
fy Descartes' statement of necessary and sufficient conditions
for metaphysical uncertainty. As we have seen, Descartes
states that a proposition is metaphysically uncertain for
him just in case he has a reason to doubt it. However, he
does not explain what it is for one proposition to provide
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him with a reason for doubting another one.
Feldman thinks Descartes' idea is captured by:
(50) p is metaphysically uncertain for S at tif and only if there is a proposition, q,such that (i) q is a practical possibilitylor Sat t; and (ii) if q were a practical
certainty for S at t , that would defeat thepractical certainty of p for S at t, thus
making p a practical uncertainty for S at
t •
According to (50), a proposition, p, is metaphysically un-
certain for an individual just in case some other proposi-
tion, q, is such that he is not justified in believing that
it is false, and if he were justified in believing q, that
would epistemically defeat his justification for believing
P-
While the first clause of (50) does not require any
explanation
,
the second one does. That clause requires that
q be such that if S were practically certain of it at t, he
would not be practically certain of p at that time, because
his practical certainty of q would epistemically defeat
his practical certainty of p. Feldman does not define the
notion of epistemic defeat, but he briefly explains it. 6
To say that if q were a practical certainty for S, that
would defeat the practical certainty of p for S is, roughly,
to say that if q were practically certain for S, any evidence
8
Feldman, Phil . Studies, 27, 45.
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that S m fact has for p would be insufficient to justify
him m adopting p. S's practical certainty of q would
defeat” or “neutralize ” his justification for p.
To further clarify ( 50 ), Feldman has us consider
Descartes' example of an atheistic geometer
.
9 Consider an
atheistic geometer whose only evidence for the theorem that
the angles of a triangle equal two right angles is the fact
that he clearly and distinctly perceives it. According
to Descartes, this theorem is metaphysically uncertain for
this geometer. The hypothesis that God deceives him pro-
vides him with a reason for doubting it.
In terms of clause (1) of (50), the hypothesis that God
deceives him is practically possible for the atheist. He is
not justified in believing that God does not do so. With
regard to clause (ii), if the atheist were to become practi-
cally certain that God deceives him, that would epistemical-
ly defeat his practical certainty of the theorem. In the
face of his practical certainty that God is willing and
able to deceive him by having him clearly and distinctly
perceive false propositions, the fact that he clearly and
distinctly perceives the theorem would be insufficient to
justify him in adopting it.
Having presented (50), Feldman uses it in an attempt
9 Ibid.
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to explain Descartes’ understanding of his initial position
He regards Descartes' as describing his initial state in the
passage
:
But when I took anything very simple and easy in thesphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration,
e.g., that two and three together made five, and
other things of the sort, were not these presentto my mind so clearly as to enable me to affirm thatthey were true? Certainly, if I judged that since
such matters could be doubted, this would not havebeen. so for any other reason than that it came into
my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me
with such a nature that I may have been deceived
even concerning things which seemed to me most
manifest. But every time that this preconceived
opinion of the sovereign power of a God presentsitself to my thought, I am constrained to confess
that it is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause
me to err, even in matters in which I believe my-
self to have the best evidence. 10
With regard to this passage, Feldman writes:
As I understand him, what Descartes is suggesting
is that prior to the time at which he comes to know
of God's existence and nature, there is just one
main reason to doubt his clear and distinct per-
ceptions. This is the hypothesis that God is a
deceiver
.
Since Descartes' understanding of God's nature is,
at the time in question, still somewhat rudimentary,
he is not yet certain that God is not a deceiver.
Hence, the proposition that God is a deceiver is
then a practical possibility for Descartes. Fur-
thermore, if it were a practical certainty for
Descartes that God is a deceiver, then it would
not be a practical certainty for him that two
plus three is five. For no matter how clearly
and distinctly one may see this latter proposi-
tion to be true, such evidence is surely worthless
if he also has good reason to believe that there
is an omnipotent and deceptive God.H
10
Haldane and Ross, I, 158 .
^Feldman, Phil . Studies
,
27, 4?.
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Feldman's explanation seems to be this. Descartes believes
that when he is in his initial position some hypotheses cast
doubt on some of his clear and distinct perceptions. The
main example of such an hypothesis is the proposition that
God is a deceiver. In terms of (50), Descartes believes that
hypothesis is practically possible for him and such that his
practical certainty of it would defeat his practical certain-
ty o^ any proposition that is evidenced solely by his clear
and distinct perception of it.
Furthermore, according to Feldman, Descartes realizes
Fhe following fact. His clearly and distinctly perceiving
some propositions is insufficient to make them metaphysically
certain, but, given ( 50 ), his clearly and distinctly per-
ceiving them and satisfying a further condition is sufficient
to do so. The further condition is that every hypothesis
that would cast doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions,
if it were practically possible for him, be practically im-
possible for him. ( 50 ) implies that if every such hypothesis
is practically impossible for Descartes, he does not have a
reason to doubt his clear and distinct perceptions and so is
metaphysically certain of all of them. Feldman claims
Descartes realizes this and takes on the task of exchanging
his initial position for one in which every such hypothesis
is practically impossible for him.
This answer to (1) contains a serious flaw, however.
Descartes does not maintain (50). That principle asserts
Ill
that to provide an individual with a reason for doubting
an hypothesis must be practically possible for him. When
we carefully consider some of Descartes' statements, it is
clear that he does not believe this.
Feldman defends his claim that Descartes limits his
reasons for metaphysical doubt to hypotheses that are practi
cally possible .
Why not allow that a proposition that is merely a
metaphysical possibility can suffice to put an-
other into doubt? There are several reasons for
framing the principle as I have
,
and requiring
that a proposition can cast metaphysical doubt
only if it is a practical possibility. In the first
place, Descartes says that reasons for doubt must
be 'powerful and maturely considered' and that
doubt must be based upon 'clear and assured rea-
sonings'. It seems unlikely that something that
is practically impossible could count as a power-
ful and maturely considered reason for doubt, or
that one could legitimately call it a clear and
assured reason for doubt. Further textual sup-
port can be derived from the passage at the end
of the Fifth Meditation in which Descartes sug-
gests that when a proposition is no longer a
practical possibility, it is no longer able to
cast metaphysical doubt. 12
Feldman cites two sources of textual support for his view.
The first is Descartes' statement that reasons for meta-
physical doubt must be powerful and maturely considered
and his statement that such doubt must be based upon clear
and assured reasonings. The second is a passage at the end
of the Fifth Meditation
.
12 Ibid
. ,
46
.
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Feldman's first source of textual support is weak.
Descartes' statements that reasons for doubt must be powerful
and maturely considered and that doubt must be based on clear
and assured reasonings are extremely vague. They suggest
that reasons for doubt must meet some requirement regarding
their plausibility, but it is not clear that this requirement
is that they be practically possible.
As his second source of support, Feldman seems to have
the following passage in mind.
And so I very clearly recognize that the certainty
and truth of all knowledge depends alone on the
knowledge of the true God, in so much that, before
I knew Him, I could not have perfect knowledge
of any other things. And now that I know Him, I
have the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge of
infinitude of things, not only of those which
relate to God Himself and other intellectual mat-
ters, but also of those which pertain to corporeal
nature in so far as it is the object of pure math-
ematics (which have no concern with whether it
exists or not) .3
According to Feldman, in this passage Descartes "suggests
that when a proposition is no longer a practical possibility,
• • 1 /iit is no longer able to cast metaphysical doubt." He seems
to find this suggestion in Descartes' statement that once he
knows God, he has the means of acquiring a perfect knowledge
of an infinitude of other propositions. Feldman seems to
interpret Descartes as claiming that once he becomes practi-
cally certain that God does not deceive him, and thereby makes
1 %aldane and Ross, I, 185*
^Feldman, Phil. Studies
,
27. 46.
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the hypothesis that God does so practically impossible for
himself, that hypothesis no longer provides him with a rea-
son for doubting his clear and distinct perceptions. This
interpretation clearly reads a great deal into Descartes'
statement
.
Moreover, some passages strongly suggest Descartes
does not limit his reasons for metaphysical doubt to practi-
cally possible hypotheses. In writing of metaphysical doubt,
Descartes states:
It was of this doubt that I said that even the
very least grounds of suspicion was a sufficient
reason for causing it. 1-5
Descartes maintains that a proposition can be rendered meta-
physically uncertain by an hypothesis that provides the very
least ground for suspecting that it is false. The very least
ground for such suspicion is not provided by hypotheses that
are practically possible
. It is provided by ones that are
practically impossible, but metaphysically possible.
In the First Meditation
, Descartes presents an example
of an instance in which a practically impossible, but meta-
physically possible, hypothesis provides him with a reason
for metaphysical doubt.
At the same time I must remember that I am a man,
and that consequently I am in the habit of sleep-
ing, and in my dreams representing to myself the
same things or sometimes even less probable things,
than do those who are insane in their waking
1
-^Haldane and Ross, II, 266.
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moments
. .
How often has it happened to me thatm "the night I dreamt that I found myself in thisparticular. place
,
that I was dressed and seated
near the fire, whilst in reality, I was laying
undressed in bed.! At this moment it does indeed
seem. to me that it is with eyes awake that I amlooking at this paper; that this head which I
move is not asleep, that it is deliberately and
of set purpose that I extend my hand and perceive
it, what
. happens in sleep does not appear so clear
and distinct as does all this
. But in thinking
over this I remind myself that on many occasions
I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions,
and in dwelling carefully on this reflection I
see so manifestly that there are no certain in-
dications by which we may clearly distinguish
wakefulness from sleep that I am lost in aston-
ishment. And my astonishment is such that it is
almost capable of persuading me that I now dream.
Descartes regards the hypothesis that he is in bed dreaming
as casting metaphysical doubt for him on the proposition
that he is sitting in front of a fire. But, that hypothesis
is not practically possible for him, though it is metaphysi-
cally possible. His senses provide him with sufficient
evidence to justify him in believing that he is not in bed
dreaming, though they do not maximally justify him in that
belief. Descartes himself seems to note this fact in the
third and fourth sentences of this passage.
Feldman's answer to (1), therefore, is incorrect.
Descartes does not maintain (50), but instead maintains that
practically impossible hypotheses can cast metaphysical doubt.
16Ibid.
,
I, 145.
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3. Feldman's answer to (2) is also incorrect. He claims
Descartes attempts to accomplish his task by following argu-
ments that will make every hypothesis that would otherwise
cast doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions practically
impossible for him. Descartes' attempt involves more than,
this, however.
Descartes believes that the success of his attempt
places him in a position in which he is metaphysically cer-
tain of any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.
On his epistemology, to exchange his initial position for
such a state, he must do more than make every hypothesis that
casts doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions in his
initial position a practical impossibility for him. As we
have seen, he believes that those hypotheses continue to
cast metaphysical doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions
even when they are practically impossible for him.
4. Although Feldman's answers to (1) and (2) are unsuccess-
ful, it is worth noting how they are designed to provide an
adequate response to Arnauld's objection. As that objection
has been presented here, it rests on the assumption that
Descartes makes two claims. The first is that until he
accomplishes his task he is metaphysically uncertain of any
proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives. The second
is that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically
certain of some of his clear and distinct perceptions.
Adopting the same line of interpretation as Gewirth and
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Doney
,
Feldman allows for the possibility that Descartes
makes the first claim. He denies, though, that Descartes
makes the second one.
As Feldman interprets him, Descartes does not maintain
that to accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically certain
of some of his clear and distinct perceptions. He maintains
that he accomplishes his task by becoming practically cer-
tain of some propositions. He becomes practically, but not
metaphysically
,
certain of the negation of every hypothesis
that casts doubt on his clear and distinct perceptions in
his initial position. The difficulty with this answer to
Arnauld ' s objection is that it does not correctly represent
Descartes' attempt.
Feldman also considers another way of understanding
Arnauld ' s objection and argues that his interpretation pro-
vides a way of answering it. Arnauld states his objection
as follows.
The only remaining scruple I have is an uncertainty
as to how a circular reasoning is to be avoided
in saying: The only secure reason we have for be-
lieving that what we clearly and distinctly per-
ceive is true, is the fact that God exists. But
we can say that God exists, only because we clear-
ly and distinctly perceive that; therefore, prior
to being certain that God exists, we should be
certain that whatever we clearly and evidently
perceive is true. 17
Feldman suggests that we take Arnauld to be claiming that, in
the process of attempting his task, Descartes makes use of
17 Ibid.
,
II, 92.
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the arguments
:
Argument A
(1)
( 2 )
(3)
Whatever I clearly and distinctly
I clearly and distinctly perceive
Therefore, God exists.
perceive is true,
that God exists
.
Argument B
( 1 ) God exists
.
(2) If God exists, then whatever I clearly and distinct-ly perceive is true.
(3) Therefore, whatever I clearly and distinctly per-
ceive is true
.
Understanding Arnauld in this way, we can take his objection
to be that Descartes employs the circular line of reasoning
that consists of argument A followed by argument B. That line
of reasoning is circular because its conclusion is one of its
premises
.
Feldman argues that, on his interpretation, Descartes
is not open to this objection. Descartes does not follow
the line of reasoning that consists of arguments A and B.
He follows a line of reasoning that can be represented by
the arguments
:
Argument C_
(1) There exists an idea with infinite objective
reality
.
(2) The cause of an existing idea must exist and
have at least as much formal reality as the
idea has objective reality.
(3) God, by definition, is the being with infinite
formal reality.
(4) Therefore, God exists.
118
Argument D
(1) Whatever deceives is defective.
(2) God is not defective.
(3) Therefore, God does not deceive.
To Feldman, Descartes follows C and D in an attempt to become
practically certain that God is not a deceiver and, so, re-
move the hypothesis that God is one from its position as a
reason for doubt. The line of reasoning that consists of
C followed by D does not have its conclusion as one of its
premises
.
Feldman goes on to claim that it is not until Descartes
has completed argument D, and supposedly attained the epistemic
state he desires, that he attempts to become metaphysically
certain that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.
According to Feldman, Descartes attempts to do so by an
argument like the following.
Argument E
(1) Every clear and distinct perception is something.
(2) Whatever is something is caused by God.
(3) Whatever is caused by God is true.
(4) Therefore, every clear and distinct perception
is true
.
Feldman interprets Descartes as claiming that he is metaphy-
sically certain of the premises of E because he clearly and
distinctly perceives them and that he is metaphysically cer-
tain of the proposition that those premises entail E's con-
clusion for the same reason. His metaphysical certainty of
these points is sufficient to make him metaphysically certain
of E's conclusion.
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This is a plausible way of interpreting Arnauld's
objection. Feldman seems to be correct in his claim that
arguments C, D and E correctly represent Descartes’ line
of reasoning as opposed to arguments A and B. He is also
correct in his claim that the line of reasoning represented
by C* D and E is not circular in that its conclusion is not
one of its premises. He is, however, mistaken in his view
that Descartes follows arguments C and D in an attempt to
become practically certain that God is not a deceiver. We
have seen that Descartes must do more than that to remove
the hypothesis that God is one from its position as a reason
for metaphysical doubt.
5« I have presented three attempts to answer my questions
correctly by following the line of interpretation initiated
by Gewirth. Each of them has been found to be unsuccessful.
It is now time to consider whether there is any chance those
questions can be correctly answered by following that line
of interpretation.
There is not. In following that line of interpreta-
tion, we ascribe an important claim to Descartes. This is
that to accomplish his task he does not become metaphysically
certain of some of his clear and distinct perceptions. There
do not appear to be any passages that support the ascription
of this claim to Descartes, and a number of ones provide
strong evidence against it. Any attempt to answer my ques-
tions by following this line of interpretation, then, will
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be open to a fatal objection. It will attribute an important
claim to Descartes when there is no substantial textual sup-
port for doing so, and strong textual evidence against doing
so .
A close consideration of Descartes' works reveals that
there is no substantial support for attributing this claim
to him. This is further witnessed by the fact that none of
the commentators we have considered in the last two chapters
provides any such support for his ascription of this claim
to Descartes.
Furthermore, a number of passages strongly suggest
Descartes does not maintain this claim. In the Fifth
Meditation
, he writes:
For is there anything more manifest than that there
is a God, that is to say, a supreme Being, to whose
essence alone existence pertains?
And although for a firm grasp of this truth
I have need of a strenuous application of mind, at
present I not only feel myself to be as assured of
it as of all that I hold most certain, but I also
remark that the certainty of all other things de-
pends on it so absolutely, that without this know-
ledge it is impossible ever to know anything per-
fectly
Descartes makes two important claims here. He claims that
he is most certain that God exists. He thus regards himself
as being metaphysically certain of that fact. He also claims
that he must have this metaphysical certainty to attain the
state he desires. It is obvious that he regards himself
1
8
Ibid
.
,
I, 183.
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as clearly and distinctly perceiving that God exists.
^
In another passage, Descartes reviews his argument from
the Third Meditation
.
And when I consider that I doubt, that is to say,that I am an. incomplete and dependent being, theidea of a being that is complete and independent,
that is, of God, presents itself to my mind with
so much distinctness and clearness
--and from thefact alone that this idea is found in me, or that
who possess this idea exist, I conclude so cer-
tainly that God exists, and that my existence de-pends entirely on Kim in every moment of my life--
that I do not think that the human mind is cap-
able
.
of knowing anything with more evidence and
certitude
. And it seems to me that I now have
before me a road which will lead us from the con-
templation of the true God (in whom all the trea-
sures of sciences and wisdom are contained) to
the knowledge of the other objects of the universe. 20
Descartes claims that he is as certain as he can be of the
existence of God. Hence, he regards himself as being meta-
physically certain of it. Most importantly, he claims that
his metaphysical certainty of God’s existence enables him
to attain the epistemic state he desires. As already noted,
he obviously regards himself as clearly and distinctly per-
ceiving it.
Another piece of evidence is provided by one of Descartes'
statements in the Third Meditation . To accomplish his task
he presents a proof in that meditation of God's existence.
He states that:
19 . . .Descartes adopts this proposition and we have seen
that he accepts the rule of adopting a proposition only if
he clearly and distinctly perceives it.
2Q
Ibid.
,
171-172.
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. . .the proof of God's existence is grounded in
the highest evidence. 21
For that proof to he grounded in the highest evidence, its
premises must be metaphysically certain for him. Hence, it
is reasonable to suppose that Descartes regards himself as
becoming metaphysically certain of those premises in order
to accomplish his task. He also claims that he clearly and
o pdistinctly perceives them.
There is therefore a good deal of evidence against at-
tributing to Descartes the claim that he does not become
metaphysically certain of some of his clear and distinct
perceptions as a means of accomplishing his task. This and
the fact that there is no substantial evidence for attribut-
ing that claim to him effectively rule out the possibility
that the line of interpretation before us can provide suc-
cessful answers to my questions.
However, my examination of that line of interpretation
suggests one that might provide correct answers. I have
shown that there is strong evidence for interpreting
Descartes as believing that in his initial position he is
metaphysically uncertain of some of his clear and distinct
perceptions. I have also shown that there is strong textual
support for interpreting him as attempting to accomplish his
21 Ibid
. ,
170.
22 Ibid
. ,
I63.
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task by becoming metaphysically certain of some of his clear
and distinct perceptions. There is good reason to suspect,
then, that I can successfully answer my questions by in-
terpreting Descartes in both of these ways. In the next
chapter, I shall try to do so.
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CHAPTER V
In this chapter, I shall successfully answer my ques-
tions by developing the line of interpretation suggested at
the end of the last one. I shall begin by presenting a large
portion of Descartes
' epistemology
. I shall examine his
concepts of practical and metaphysical certainty, and employ
them to explain those of deduction, clear and distinct per-
ception and intuition, and the relationship between an in-
dividual s intuition of a proposition and his metaphysical
certainty of it.
1 . The concepts of practical and metaphysical certainty
were examined in the last chapter. The main results of that
examination were as follows.
For an individual to be practicality certain of a
proposition is for him to be epistemically
-justified in be-
lieving it. Practical certainty is no less a degree of
certainty than that required for ordinary knowledge, though
it is a lesser degree than that required for the perfect
knowledge that interests Descartes. The concept of practical
certainty is also an epistemic, as opposed to a psychologi-
cal, concept. An individual can be practically certain of
a proposition with or without feeling convinced of its
truth
.
In contrast, metaphysical certainty is the high degree
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of certainty required for the sort of perfect knowledge that
interests Descartes. An individual is metaphysically certain
of a proposition just when he is maximally justified in be-
lieving it. Not only is he epistemically justified in believ-
ing i o , he could not be more justified in believing anything
than he is in believing it. An individual's metaphysical
certainties are al_ practical ones, though some of his practi-
cal certainties may not be metaphysical ones. Like practical
certainty, metaphysical certainty is an epistemic, rather
than a psychological, concept.
We can define a number of concepts in terms of practical
and metaphysical certainty. In terms of practical certainty,
we have defined practical possibility, practical impossibil-
ity and practical uncertainty. In terms of metaphysical
certainty, we have defined metaphysical possibility, meta-
physical impossibility and metaphysical uncertainty. Each
concept of certainty falls into a square of opposition along
with those defined in terms of it.
Descartes also states a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for metaphysical uncertainty. He claims a proposition
is metaphysically uncertain for an individual just in case
some other proposition provides him with a reason to doubt
it. However, he does not explain what it is for one proposi-
tion to provide him with a reason for doubting another one.
Stated roughly, Descartes' idea seems to be this. An
individual's belief is metaphysically uncertain for him just
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m case there is an hypothesis that (i) is possible for him
in the sense that he is not certain that it is false
,
and
( 11 ) is such that in being possible for him, it detracts
from the strength of his justification for his belief.
We have seen that Descartes' idea is not adequately
captured by:
(50) p is a metaphysical uncertainty for S at t
if and only if there is a proposition, q,
such that (i) q is a practical possibility
for S at t; and (ii) if q were a practical
certainty for S at t
,
that would defeat
his practical certainty of p at t, thus
making p a practical uncertainty for S at t.
This principle says, among other things, that an hypothesis
provides an individual with a reason for metaphysical doubt
only if it is practically possible for him. In the First
Meditation
, however, Descartes regards the hypothesis that
he is in bed dreaming as providing him with a reason for
doubting the proposition that he is sitting in front of a
fire. That hypothesis is practically impossible for him at
that point, though it is metaphysically possible for him.
This difficulty with (50) suggests:
(51) P is a metaphysical uncertainty for S at t
if and only if there is an hypothesis, q,
such that (i) q is a metaphysical possibility
for S at t; and (ii) if q were a practical
certainty for S at t, that would defeat his
practical certainty of p at t, thus making p a
practical uncertainty for S at t.
The only difference between (5°) and (51) is in condition (i).
To accommodate Descartes' First Mieditation doubt, the re-
quirement that q be practically possible has been replaced
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"by the weaker one that it be metaphysically possible.
Before accepting (51), however, we ought to consider
its second condition carefully. This condition requires that
q be such that if S were practically certain of it, he would
be practically uncertain of p, because his practical cer-
tainty of q would epistemically defeat his practical cer-
tainty of p. In considering Feldman's interpretation, we
examined his brief explanation of this condition. To say
that S's practical certainty of q would epistemically defeat
his practical certainty of p is , roughly, to say that if S
were practically certain of q, any evidence he in fact has
for p would be insufficient to justify him in believing p.
His practical certainty of q would "defeat" or "neutralize"
his justification for p.
To increase our understanding of this condition and
of (51) in general, let us look at some examples. Consider
an atheistic geometer whose only evidence for the theorem
that the angles of a triangle equal two right angles is that
he clearly and distinctly perceives it. According to Descartes,
this theorem is rendered metaphysically uncertain for this
geometer by the hypothesis that God is a deceiver. 1
( 51 ) provides the following explanation of this case.
With regard to condition (i) of (51). the hypothesis that
God is a deceiver is metaphysically possible for the atheist.
1 Haldane and Ross, II, 39-
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With regard to condition (ii), if the atheist were practically
certain that God is a deceiver, he would not be practically
certain of that theorem, and this is because his practical
certainty that God is a deceiver would epistemically defeat
his practical certainty of the theorem. If he were practical-
ly certain that God is a deceiver, he would still be clearly
and distinctly perceiving the theorem, but the fact that he
was doing so would not justify him in adopting it.
As another example, assume p is the proposition that
Descartes is standing in front of the Sorbonne, q is the
proposition that he is in bed dreaming, and r is the propo-
sition that Descartes is at home sitting in front of a fire.
Suppose also that p is evidenced for Descartes by various
sense perceptions of himself and the Sorbonne which make him
practically, but not metaphysically, certain of p, and that
q and r are metaphysically possible for him. On Descartes'
understanding of metaphysical doubt, in this situation q
casts doubt for him on p, but r does not do so.
( 51 ) provides the following explanation of this case.
With regard to the relationship between q and p, q is meta-
physically possible for Descartes; so it satisfies condition
(i). It also satisfies condition (ii) . If Descartes were
practically certain of q, he would not be practically cer-
tain of p and this is because his practical certainty of q
would epistemically defeat his practical certainty of p.
If he were to become practically certain that he is dreaming,
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his sensory evidence for the proposition that he is standing
in front of the Sorbonne would be insufficient to justify
him in believing it.
With respect to the relationship between r and p, r
is metaphysically possible for Descartes and so it too
satisfies condition (i). However, r does not satisfy con-
dition (ii) with regard to p. If Descartes were practically
certain of r, he would be practically uncertain of p, but
this is not because his practical certainty of r would
epistemically defeat his practical certainty of p. Let us
see why this is the case.
If Descartes were to become practically certain that
he is at home sitting in front of a fire, he would do so
by having some sense perceptions of himself sitting in his
house. As a result, he would cease having the sense per-
ceptions he is in fact having of himself and the Sorbonne
.
In the absence of those sense perceptions, he would no longer
be practically certain that he is standing in front of the
Sorbonne
.
Yet while Descartes' practical certainty of r would
result in his practical uncertainty of p, this is not because
his practical certainty of r would defeat his practical cer-
tainty of p. His practical certainty of r would not place
him in a situation in which he still had the sensations that
provide him with his evidence for p, but in which those sen-
sations failed to make him practically certain of p. Rather,
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his practical certainty of r would result in his practical
uncertainty of p by placing him in a situation in which he
was not even having the sensations that provide him with his
evidence for p.
This example raises an interesting question. Descartes’
practical certainty of r would not epistemically defeat his
practical certainty of p because it would change "too much”
Ox his psychological and epistemic state with regard to p
in order to result in his practical uncertainty of p. The
question arises of how we are to specify exactly what "too
much” amounts to in cases such as this one.
The answer to this question escapes me
. However, I
think our intuitions on this matter are sufficiently clear
for us to handle the few cases of metaphysical uncertainty
I will consider.
Besides helping us understand (51), these examples
show it correctly captures Descartes' idea. The first one
shows it provides a plausible explanation of Descartes'
claim that the hypothesis that God is a deceiver prevents
an atheist from being metaphysically certain of some theorems
despite his clear and distinct perception of them. The
second one shows (51) plausibly explains Descartes' claim
that the hypothesis that he is dreaming casts metaphysical
2doubt on propositions evidenced solely by his senses.
2 Ibid .
.
I, 145-146.
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With the ascription of (51) to Descartes, my examination
of his concepts of practical and metaphysical certainty is
complete. I shall now consider those of deduction, clear
and distinct perception and intuition! and the relationship
between an individual's intuition of a proposition and his
metaphysical certainty of it.
2. Descartes characterizes deduction as ”a process
that involves a sort of movement on the part of the mind
when it infers one thing from another . . . ."-"He also main-
tains that in performing a deduction an individual clearly
and distinctly perceives its premises and its conclusion.
He states that in performing a deduction the mind has "a
clear vision of each step in the process." Descartes denies,
though, that his deduction of a proposition implies his
metaphysical certainty of it.^
These considerations suggest:
(52) S. deduces p at t =df. S clearly and dis-
tinctly perceives p at t and he comes to
do so by clearly and distinctly perceiving
the premises of an argument, A, that has p
as its conclusion and clearly and distinctly
perceiving that the conjunction of those
premises entails p.
In writing of an individual's deduction of a proposition, I
shall at times refer to the premises of his deduction.
3Ibid .
, 33.
^ Ibid.
. ,
8 .
5Ibid
.
,
33-
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These are the premises of the relevant argument A, their con-
junction, and the proposition that their conjunction entails
A's conclusion.
Definition (52) employs the concept of clear and
distinct perception. Descartes’ definition of this concept
notoriously vague. It is reasonable, however, to under-
stand it m this way. To perceive a proposition clearly
ana distinctly is to apprehend it in a particular manner.
In accord with Descartes’ acceptance of (19), whenever an
individual apprehends a proposition in this way he is psy-
chologically certain of it. However, some propositions are
such that an individual can apprehend them in this way and
yet not be metaphysically certain of them. Descartes main-
tains, for example, that an atheist can clearly and dis-
tictly perceive the theorem that the angles of a triangle
equal two right angles and yet not be metaphysically certain
of it. Moreover, although Descartes does not consider
this point, it seems an individual could clearly and distinct-
ly perceive this theorem and yet not be practically certain
of it
.
Understanding clear and distinct perception along
these lines, we can consider Descartes' concept of intuition.
Some commentators regard Descartes as identifying his intuition
6 Ibid
. , 237 .
7 Ibid
. , II, 33.
perception of
of a proposition with his clear and distinct
it, but we have seen that he does not do so. in theI Rule s
.
he writes:
in. its totality at the same time and not
successively
.
The second condition Descartes presents is admittedly unclear.
Still, the passage suggests he regards his clear and dis-
tinct perception of a proposition as a necessary, but not
a sufficient, condition of his intuition of it.
Descartes also distinguishes between two kinds of
intuition
.
The upshot of the matter is that it is possible to
say. that those propositions indeed which are im-
mediately deduced from first principles are known
now by . intuition, now by deduction, i.e. in a way
that differs according to our point of view.
But, the. first principles are given by intuition
alone while, on the contrary, the remote con-
clusions are furnished only by deduction. 9
In the first sentence, Descartes claims that propositions im-
mediately deduced from first principles are known in a
rather special way
. If we consider the way we know them
from one point of view, we see that we intuit them. If
we consider it from another point of view, we see that we
deduce them. Descartes' point seems to be that we know
6 Ibid
. ,
I, 33.
9Ibid., 8.
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these propositions by intuiting them in a way that involves
their being deduced. In the next sentence, he claims that
other propositions, those that are first-principles, are
known in a way that involves their being intuited, but not
tneir being deduced. His point seems to be that we intuit
these propositions without deducing them. I shall refer
to these two kinds of intuition as deductive intuition and
direct intuition, respectively, and begin my examination
of them with direct intuition.
Descartes maintains that he does not clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive just any proposition when he has a direct
intuition. Rather, he clearly and distinctly perceives one
xhat is a "primary and self-evident principle ."10 He does
not fully explain this point, but it is reasonable to sup-
pose his position is the following. The propositions that
are directly intuitable by him are rather special ones.
Most propositions are such that to be justified in believ-
ing them, he first has to be justified in believing some
other ones that constitute his evidence for them. But the
ones that are directly intuitable by him are not like that.
He can be justified in believing them even if he is not
justified in believing any others. This is because each
is such that whenever Descartes clearly and distinctly per-
ceives it, he is justified in believing it. We can capture
10Ibid.
,
19 .
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this requirement by the condition that an individual car.
directly intuit a proposition only if his clear and distinct
perception of it entails his practical certainty of it.
Descartes' concept of direct intuition is thus de-
finable in terms of those of clear and distinct perception
and practical certainty.
(53) 2 d^rec bly intuits p at t = df . S clearly
and distinctly perceives p at t and p is
epistemically basic for S at t
.
(5^) p is epistemically basic for S at t =df.
it is possible that S clearly and dis-
tinctly perceives p at t and it is neces-
sary that if S clearly and distinctly per-
ceives p at t, then p is practically cer-
tain for S at t.
Two points should be observed here. First, the state of
directly intuiting a proposition is not one in which an
individual's practical certainty of it depends upon there
being some proposition that provides him with his evidence.
Rather, his practical certainty results from his clear and
distinct perception of a proposition that is epistemically
basic for him.
Second, Descartes never states exactly which proposi-
tions are epistemically basic for him, but he presents what
he takes to be examples of such propositions. These examples
include some necessary truths and some contingent ones. He
claims that the necessary truth that things identical to
a third thing are identical to each other is basic for him. 11
11
Ibid., 41.
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He denies though that the proposition that four and three
equal seven is epistemically basic. 12 His reason for dis-
tinguishing between these two propositions is that the former
has a- simpler structure than the latter. 13 He also appears
to maintain that any necessary truth basic for him is epis-
temically basic for anyone else. He might, then, say that
such propositions are universally basic. As examples of
contingent propositions epistemically basic for him, Descartes
presents the one that he exists and the one that he thinks. 1 ^
Once again, he does not clearly explain why these contingent
propositions are basic for him. However, he clearly does
not think that every contingent proposition basic for him
is basic for everyone else
. He believes that the proposition
that he exists is basic for him, but obviously he denies
that this proposition is basic for Arnauld
.
Descartes claims that to intuit a proposition deductive-
ly he must satisfy two requirements: He must deduce it from
premises he is directly intuiting, and he must intuit each
premise simultaneously with his clear and distinct perception
1 5
of the conclusion. If he meets both of these requirements
with regard to a proposition, he is deductively intuiting it.
1
2
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.
,
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Deductive intuition may be defined inductively:
(55) (i) If S is deducing p at t and S is dir-
ectly intuiting each premise of hisdeduction at t, then S is deductively
intuiting p at t
.
(ii) If S is deducing p at t and every prem-
ise of S's deduction is such that S is
either deductively intuiting it solely
on the basis of other premises of his
deduction at t or directly intuiting it
at t, then S is deductively intuiting
p at t
.
(HI) D is deductively intuiting p at t only
if S satisfies the antecedent of (i)
or of (ii) with regard to p and t.
Clause (i) is the base case; as such it covers those instances
where S extends the scope of his intuition by deducing a
proposition from his direct intuitions. Clause (ii) is
the inductive case and covers those instances where S ex-
tends his intuition even further by deducing propositions
from his direct and deductive intuitions. Finally, (iii)
asserts that the only cases of deductive intuition are those
satisfying (i) or (ii).
The next thing to consider is Descartes' claim that
whenever he directly or deductively intuits a proposition,
it is metaphysically certain for him. That he makes this
claim is suggested by his statement that whenever he intuits
a proposition it is "as sure as it can be . . . The def-
initions I have given of direct and deductive intuition and
principle (51) imply that it is correct.
Consider the case of direct intuition. (51) implies
1
6
Ibid
. ,
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the premise:
(56) p is a metaphysical certainty for S at t
suc^hafbf th6re lE n ° P-POsitio5 q,forVatV 3 is metaphysically possibler ^ t i
, and ( 11 ) if q were a practice]certainty for S at t, that would defeat hispractical of p at t, thus making p a practi-cal uncertainty for S at t.
o l
As a second premise
, we have
:
(5?) If S directly intuits p at t, there is noproposition, q, such that (i) q i s meta-physically possible for S at t; and (ii)if q were a practical certainty for S att
,
. that would defeat his practical cer-tainty of p at t, thus making p a practi-
cal uncertainty for S at t
.
Inspection shows that these premises entail the desired re
suit
:
( 5£
)
I-l S directly intuits p at t, then p is
metaphysically certain for S at t
.
The crucial premise is (57). (51) and the definition
of direct intuition provide Descartes with a satisfactory
defense of it. Suppose S directly intuits p. To establish
(57)> it is sufficient to show that no proposition is such
that S s practical certainty of it would epistemically de-
feat his practical certainty of p.
To see that no proposition has this property, consider
an example. Let r be a complex mathematical theorem. In
fact, let r be such that if S were to become practically
certain of it, he would do so by deducing it in a very in-
volved deduction that did not have p as one of its premises.
His deduction of r would be so involved that it would complete-
ly occupy his attention and prevent him from apprehending
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any proposition not involved in the deduction.
Since S is directly intuiting it. p is either a very
simple necessary truth or a proposition concerning his exis-
tence or intellectual state. As a result, r does not provide
S with a reason to doubt p. even if r is metaphysically pos-
sible for him. r, rememDer, is a complex theorem of math-
ematics. Consequently, given (51), S's practical certainty
of r would not epistemically defeat his practical certainty
of p
.
The reason S's practical certainty of r would not epis-
temically defeat his practical certainty of p is not that
it would fail to make him practically uncertain of p. S's
practical certainty of r would in fact do so. If S were
practically certain of r, he would be deducing it in a de-
duction that completely occupied his attention. As a result,
he would not be clearly and distinctly perceiving p and,
hence, he would be practically uncertain of it.
S's practical certainty of r would fail to defeat his
practical certainty of p because it would change "too much"
of his psychological and epistemic state with regard to p.
Instead of preventing his clear and distinct perception of
p from making him practically certain of p, it would place
him in a situation in which he did not clearly and distinctly
perceive p at all. Although such a situation would result
in S's practical uncertainty of p, it would not bring about
an epistemic defeat of his practical certainty of p.
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v 59 If S deduces p at t and all the premises
ol S^s deduction are metaphysically certainfor S at t, then p is metaphysically certainfor S at t.
This principle is suggested by Descartes' statement that
"many things are known with certainty, though [they are] not
by themselves evident, but [are] only deduced from true and
known principles.
. .
."
1?
( 59 ) i s also clearly correct.
aH the premises of ^'s deduction are metaphysically
certain for him, he is metaphysically certain of each pre-
mise of the relevant argument A, their conjunction, and the
proposition that their conjunction entails p. These meta-
physically certain propositions constitute his evidence for
p. If he is metaphysically certain of all of them, he is
metaphysically certain of p. He has a reason to doubt p
only if he has a reason to doubt one of them.
The argument to show that (58) and (59) imply that
Descartes' deductive intuitions are metaphysically certain
is an inductive one
. In the base case we show that if an
instance B of deductive intuition has no deductively in-
tuited premises, its conclusion is metaphysically certain.
This is easily shown. If B has no deductively intuited pre-
mises, every premise is directly intuited. By (58). then,
every premise is metaphysically certain and, by ( 59 ). the
conclusion is too.
17Ibid., 28.
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For the inductive case, we adopt the hypothesis that,
for an arbitrary n, if an instance B of deductive intuition
has n or fewer deductively intuited premises, the conclusion
of E is metaphysically certain. We show that this hypothesis
implies that any instance of deductive intuition having n + 1
deductively intuited premises has a metaphysically certain
conclusion. Assume C has n + 1 deductively intuited prem-
ises. Every premise of C that is directly intuited is meta-
physically certain by (58). Every premise of C that is de-
ductively intuited is deduced in a deduction containing n
or fewer deductively intuited premises, since C itself only
has n + 1 such premises. Our assumption implies, then, that
every deductively intuited premise of C is metaphysically
certain. Given our assumption, we may therefore conclude
that, every premise of C is metaphysically certain and that,
by ( 59 ), its conclusion is metaphysically certain as well.
The base and inductive cases have yielded two con-
clusions. The first is that any instance of deductive in-
tuition having no deductively intuited premises has a meta-
physically certain conclusion. The second is that, for an
arbitrary n, if any instance of deductive intuition having
n or fewer deductively intuited premises has a metaphysical-
ly certain conclusion, any instance of deductive intuition
having n + 1 such premises has a metaphysically certain
conclusion. Taken together, these results imply that every
instance of deductive intuition has a metaphysically certain
conclusion.
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As I have presented it, Descartes' epistemology pro-
vides him with two ways of becoming metaphysically certain
of propositions. If a proposition is epistemically basic
for him, he can become metaphysically certain of it by
directly intuiting it. He can become metaphysically cer-
tain of still more propositions by deductively intuiting
them on the basis of his direct intuitions. My next step is
to consider the task Descartes sets for himself in terms of
these features of his epistemology.
3 - In considering other interpretations, I have examined
a. number of Descartes' statements regarding his task. One
suggests an answer to my first question that is based on
my examination of his epistemology. In replying to the
S e c ond Se_t of Objections to the Meditations
. Descartes
contrasts himself once he has completed his task with an
atheist who has not done so.
That an atheist can know clearly that the three
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles,
I do not deny, I merely affirm that on the other
hand, such knowledge on his part cannot constitute
true science, because no knowledge that can be
rendered doubtful should be called science.
^
Descartes claims that, unlike himself, an atheist who has
not completed his task is unable to have the certainty of
the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal two right
angles that he requires for perfect knowledge of it. Ac-
cording to Descartes, this certainty is metaphysical cer-
tainty. Descartes acknowledges, however, that the atheist
l£Ibid
. ,
II, 39.
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can clearly and distinctly perceive the theorem.
This passage suggests a rough answer to (1). Descartes
wants to formulate a procedure hy which he can become meta-
pnysically certain of propositions of a particular sort.
An example of one of these propositions is the theorem that
the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. Prior to
completing his task, Descartes can perceive these proposi-
tions clearly and distinctly, but his clear and distinct
perception of them is insufficient to make him metaphysically
certain of them. According to Descartes, the procedure he
formulates is not available to an atheist.
This answer can be developed a bit further. As he
begins the Third keditat ion
, Descartes finds himself in the
following situation. There are a number of propositions he
can directly intuit. There are also some that he can de-
ductively intuit by deducing them from the epistemically
basic propositions of the sciences to which they belong.
However, there are true propositions he can clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive, but which he can neither directly intuit
nor deductively intuit by deducing them from the basic
truths of their sciences.
An example of such a proposition is the theorem that
the angles of a triangle equal two right angles. Descartes
can clearly and distinctly perceive this theorem, but it is
too complicated for him to intuit it directly. Nor, can he
deductively intuit it by deducing it from basic mathematical
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trutns. To do so, he would have to intuit some mathematical
truths directly and, while doing so, deductively intuit on
the basis of them a series of propositions that ended in
thi_ theorem. He is unable to accomplish such an intel-
lectual feat. The required deduction would contain more
steps than he could intuit simultaneously.
Moreover, although Descartes regards his direct or
deductive intuition of a preposition as implying his meta-
physical certainty of it, he does not regard his mere clear
and distinct perception of one as doing so. The hypothesis
that uod deceives him is metaphysically possible for him
and, as a result, it provides him with a reason to doubt
propositions he clearly and distinctly perceives but does
not intuit.
What Descartes lacks in his initial position is a
procedure for becoming metaphysically certain of those propo-
sitions he can clearly and distinctly perceive, but which
he can neither directly intuit nor deductively intuit by
deducing them from the epistemically basic truths of the
sciences to which they belong. His task is to formulate
such a procedure
.
There is further textual support for this answer. In
the Rules
, Descartes writes that:
The upshot of the matter is that it is possible
to say that those propositions indeed which are
immediately deduced from first principles are
known now by intuition, now by deduction, i.e.
in a way that differs according to our point
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°f view. But, the first principles are given
cy intuition alone, while, on the contrary, the
remote conclusions are furnished only bv de-duction. 19 J
He acknowledges that some sciences contain "remote” truths
which he can deduce
,
but which he can neither directly in-
tuit nor deductively intuit on the basis of their epistemical-
ly basic truths.
My second question is how does Descartes attempt his
task. It is clear that in doing so, he presents an argument
the claim that all his clear and distinct perceptions
are true
. However
,
it is not clear how this argument pro-
vides him with the sort of procedure he desires.
One way of interpreting Descartes' attempt is the fol-
lowing. He tries to formulate a procedure by which he can
deductively intuit any proposition he can clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive. He begins with propositions he believes
to be epistemically basic for him and on the basis of them
tries to construct an argument that will lead him to intuit
deductively that all his clear and distinct perceptions are
true. With the aid of this argument, he formulates a pro-
cedure for deductively intuiting the propositions that in-
terest him. He deduces such a proposition in a line of
reasoning that consists of his deductive intuition that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true, his direct
19Ibid., I, 8.
147
intuition that he is clearly and distinctly perceiving the
proposition that interests him, and his direct intuition
that the other premises of his deduction entail that proposi-
tion. In this way, he supposedly intuits the proposition
that interests him and so becomes metaphysically certain
of it
.
Perhaps this answer can he more easily appreciated by
considering the theorem that the angles of a triangle equal
two right angles. Descartes cannot directly intuit this
theorem. Nor can he deductively intuit it on the basis
of his intuition of epistemically basic mathematical truths.
To become metaphysically certain of it, he presents two
arguments for it. He first deduces it from some other math-
ematical theorems. This deduction may make him practically
certain of the theorem, but it does not make him metaphysic-
ally certain of it. The most important point is that it
leads him to perceive the theorem clearly and distinctly.
He employs this fact in an attempt to construct an argument
that will lead him to intuit the theorem deductively and
so become metaphysically certain of it. He derives the
premise that all his clear and distinct perceptions are
true from some other ones, including the one that God exists
and is not a deceiver. He derives the theorem itself from
the premise that all his clear and distinct perceptions are
true and the premise that he clearly and distinctly perceives
the theorem. He believes that in following this argument he
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intuits every one of its premises simultaneously with his
clear and distinct perception of its conclusion and so deduct-
ively intuits the theorem.
This way of interpreting Descartes has a number of
benefits. It explains why he thinks his procedure is un-
available to an atheist. Employing that procedure involves
following an argument containing the premise that God exists.
An individual cannot employ that procedure and still remain
an atheist. In doing so, he must clearly and distinctly per-
ceive the premise that God exists and so become convinced of
its truth.
This interpretation also provides a plausible way of
understanding Descartes' statement when he finishes his task
in the Principles :
Whence it follows that the light of nature, or
the faculty of knowledge which God has given us,
can never disclose to us any object which is not
true inasmuch as it comprehends it, that is, in-
asmuch as it apprehends it clearly and distinctly.
Because we should have had reason to think God a
deceiver if He had given us this faculty per-
verted, or such that we should take the false for
the true (when using the faculty aright) . And
this should deliever us from the supreme doubt
which encompassed us when we did not know whether
our nature had been such that we had been de-
ceived in things that seemed most clear. It
should also protect us against all the other
reasons already mentioned which we had for
doubting. The truths of mathematics should now
be above suspicion, for they are of the clearest.
And if we perceive anything by our senses, either
waking or sleeping, if it is clear and distinct,
and if we separate it from what is obscure and
confused, we shall^easily assure ourselves of
what is the truth.
20
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Descartes deduces the principle that all his clear and dis-
tinct perceptions are true and claims that his doing so pro-
vides him with a way of becoming metaphysically certain of
any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives. My answer
to (2) provides a very plausible interpretation of his posi-
tion. He regards himself as having found a way of deductive-
ly intuiting the principle that all his clear and distinct
perceptions are true, and believes that this principle pro-
vides him with a way of deductively intuiting, and so becom-
ing metaphysically certain of, any proposition he clearly
and distinctly perceives.
My interpretation also provides a plausible way of
understanding Descartes' view in the Meditations that, having
completed his task, he can be metaphysically certain of any
proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives; for as he
says in the Rules :
mankind has no road towards certain knowledge
open to it, save those of self-evident intuition
and necessary deduction ... .22
His position is that direct and deductive intuition consti-
tute his only way of attaining metaphysical certainty and
that after completing his task he can directly or deductively
21
The principle that all his clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true plays another very important role for
Descartes . It implies that any proposition he directly or
deductively intuits is true.
22Ibid
.
,
45.
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intuit any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives.
This brings me to the question of whether Descartes
'
attempt is successful. The main point to consider is whether
his attempt is open to Arnauld's objection.
Arnauld
' s objection, we may recall, is stated this way:
The only remaining scruple I have is an uncertainty
as to how a circular reasoning is to be avoided
in saying: The only secure reason we have forbelieving
. that what we clearly and distinctly
perceive is xrue is the fact that God exists.
But we can say that God exists
,
only because we
clearly and distinctly perceive that; there-
fore, prior to being certain that God exists,
we should be certain that whatever we clearly
and distinctly perceive is true. 2 3
Most of the commentators we have considered understand
Arnauld's objection in the same way. They interpret it as
follows: Descartes maintains that until he accomplishes
his task, he is metaphysically uncertain of any proposition
he clearly and distinctly perceives, but that to accomplish
his task he becomes metaphysically certain of some of his
clear and distinct perceptions. His attempt is, therefore,
open to the objection that on his own position it can be
successful only if he has already accomplished his task when
he undertakes it.
On my interpretation, this objection is based on a
misunderstanding. Descartes does not maintain that until
he accomplishes his task he is metaphysically uncertain of
any proposition he clearly and distinctly perceives. He
23Ibid., II, 92.
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claims that prior to completing his task, he is metaphysic-
ally certain of any such proposition provided that he direct-
ly or deductively intuits it—these being special cases of
clear and distinct perception. While he maintains that to
accomplish his task he becomes metaphysically certain of
some of his clear and distinct perceptions, these perceptions
are all cases of direct or deductive intuition.
Arnauld s objection might be interpreted as affirming
that a circular argument is involved in Descartes' procedure
for deductively intuiting any proposition he can clearly and
distinctly perceive. According to Arnauld, that procedure
involves the following argument:
Argument A
(1) Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive is true.
(2) I clearly and distinctly perceive that God exists.
(3) Goa exists.
(4) If God exists, then whatever I clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive is true.
( 5 ) Therefore, whatever I clearly and distinct per-
ceive is true.
This argument seeks to show that all Descartes' clear and
distinct perceptions are true and it is circular.
But Descartes' procedure does not involve A. His argu-
ment for the principle that all his clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true is given in a condensed form by:
Argument B
(1) I have an idea of God.
(2) If (1), there is something that causes my idea
of God and has as much formal reality as my
idea has objective reality.
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(3) There is something that causes my idea of God
and has as much formal reality as my idea has
objective reality.
(4) If ( 3 ), God exists.
(5) God exists.
( 6 ) God is a deceiver only if He is defective.
[?) God is not defective.
( 8 ) God is not a deceiver.
(9) If (5) and ( 8 ), all my clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true
.
("l"^ Therefore
,
all my clear and distinct perceptions
are true
.
This argument is not circular. Descartes does, of course,
maintain that in following B he intuits, and so clearly
^^d distinctly perceives
,
each one of its premise s
. However
,
he does not try to derive any of those premises from the fact
that he clearly and distinctly perceives it and the prin-
ciple that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true.
I have considered the two most plausible statements
of Arnauld ' s objection. Since Descartes is not cpen to
either of them, I conclude that my interpretation provides
him with an adequate response to Arnauld.
I have presented a large portion of Descartes' epistem-
ology in a way that correctly answers my questions along
the lines suggested at the end of the last chapter. It re-
mains for me to strengthen my case for these answers by
responding to some objections that might be brought against
them, and to consider some of the points that remain to be
examined even if my answers are correct.
153
CHAPTER VI
By way of closing my discussion, I shall consider three
objections to my interpretation, and note some of the points
that remain to be examined even if my answers are correct
.
1 . The first objection is directed against my answer to (1 )
.
That answer attributes to Descartes the claim that his
direct intuitions are always metaphysically certain for him.
It does so on the basis of textual evidence from the Rules.
Question (1), however, concerns Descartes' task in the Med-
itations, and passages from that work suggest that he re-
gards his direct intuitions as being metaphysically uncer-
tain in his initial position. That suggestion is strengthened
by passages from the Principles
. where Descartes repeats
his task.
An important passage from the Latin edition of the
Meditations is correctly translated as:
But when I took anything very simple and easy in
the sphere of arithmetic or geometry into con-
sideration, e.g. that two and three together made
five, and other things of that sort, were not
these present to my mind so clearly as to enable
me to affirm that they were true? Certainly if
I judged that since such matters could be doubted,
this would not have been so for any other reason
than that it came into my mind that perhaps a
God might have endowed me with such a nature that
I may have been deceived even concerning things
which s-eemed to me most manifest. But every time
that this preconceived opinion of the sovereign
power of a God presents itself to my thought,
I am constrained to confess that it is easy to
1 54
Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to err, even in
matters which I regard myself as intuiting in the
most evident manner.
1
Descartes claims the hypothesis that God is a deceiver pro-
vides him with a reason for doubting propositions of a par-
ticular sort, even when he clearly and distinctly perceives
them. He states that these propositions include very simple
ones. This suggests that he regards them as including epis-
temically basic ones that he directly intuits upon clearly
and distinctly perceiving them. In the Rule
s
he character-
izes epistemically basic propositions as being ones that
are simple rather than complex. This suggestion is rein-
forced by the last sentence of the passage. Descartes ex-
plicitly claims there that the hypothesis that God is a
deceiver provides him with a reason for doubting propositions
despite his intuition of them.
Shortly after this passage, Descartes describes his
initial position.
And certainly, since I have no reason to believe
that there is a God who is a deceiver, and as I
have not yet satisfied myself that there is a
God at all, the reason for doubt which depends on
this opinion alone is very slight, and so to
speak, metaphysical. But in order to be able
to altogether remove it, I must inquire whether
there is a God as soon as the occasion presents
itself; and if I find that there is a God, I must
Adam and Tannery, VII, 36. This is my translation of
the passage in Adam and Tannery.
2
Haldane and Ross, I, J>6
.
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also inquire whether He may be a deceiver; for
without a knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything.
3
Descartes claims that so long as he is in his initial posi-
tion, no proposition is metaphysically certain for him.
This includes any he directly intuits.
In the Fifth Meditation
. Descartes repeats this claim.
And so I clearly recognize that the certainty and
truth of all knowledge depends alone on the know-
ledge of the true God, in so much that, before I
knew Him, I could not have a perfect knowledge
of any other thing.
^
He claims that, in his initial position, he is not certain of
any proposition in a way required for perfect knowledge.
Since he regards metaphysical certainty as being all the
certainty required for perfect knowledge, he is claiming
that no proposition is metaphysically certain for him in his
initial position.
Descartes also makes this claim in the Principles
. He
writes that the mind
can have no certain knowledge until it is acquainted
with its creator.
5
It is reasonable to assume he has metaphysical certainty in
mind, and is claiming that in his initial position no prop-
osition is metaphysically certain for him including any he
directly intuits.
Another important passage from the Principles is:
3 Ibid
.
, 159
^ Ibid
. ,
185.
3 Ibid
. ,
224.
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We shall also doubt of all things which have former
seemed to us quite certain, even of the demonstra-tions of mathematics and of its principles which
we formerly thought quite self-evident. One reasonis that those who have fallen into error in reason-ing on such matters have held as perfectly certain
and self-evident what we see to be false, but ayet more important reason is that we have been toldthat God who created us can do all that He desires.
For we are still ignorant of whether He may nothave desired to create us in such a way that we
shall always be deceived, even in the things that
we believe ourselves to know best; ... .6
iy
Descartes is again considering the extent of his metaphysical
uncertainty in his initial position. He states that it in-
cludes mathematical theorems that are epistemically basic
for him. Since he elsewhere regards these theorems as
objects of his direct intuition, this strongly suggests that
he believes his direct intuitions are metaphysically uncer-
tain in his initial position.
This is an impressive objection. Yet, it is not as
strong as it might appear. The evidence provided by these
passages is effectively counter-balanced by a number of con-
siderations .
Consider the first passage. It admits of a very plau-
sible interpretation on which it is in accord with my answer
to (1). While Descartes claims there that the hypothesis
that God is a deceiver casts metaphysical doubt on simple
propositions he clearly and distinctly perceives, it is
doubtful that he has epistemically basic ones in mind. He
cites the theorem that two and three equal five as an example
6 Ibid ., 220.
7 Ibid
. ,
8
.
157
of a sample proposition. In the Rules
. where he character-
izes basic propositions in terms of their simplicity, that
theorem is classified as a complex proposition .
“
Although in the Latin edition of the Meditations
.
Descartes claims in the last sentence of this passage that
the hypothesis that God is a deceiver casts doubt on his
intuitions, in the French edition he does not do so. As it
occurs in that edition, that sentence is correctly translated
as :
But every time that this preconceived opinion of
the sovereign power of a God presents itself to
my thought, I am constrained to confess that it
is easy to Him, if He wishes it, to cause me to
err, even in the things which I believe myself
to know with very great evidence.
9
The reference to objects of intuition has been replaced by
one to things for which there is very great evidence. It is
reasonable to interpret this new reference as one to prop-
ositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived, but not
intuited. Since the French edition is later than the
Latin one, it is also reasonable to regard it as represent-
ing Descartes' considered opinion on this matter.
The remaining passages are a little more difficult to
handle. They cannot be plausibly understood so that they
do not suggest that Descartes regards his direct intuitions
8 Ibid . , 43.
^Adam and Tannery, IX, 28. This is my translation of
the passage in Adam and Tannery.
10
This point was brought to my attention by John Morris
in his paper: "A Flea for the French Descartes,” Dialogue ,
6 (1967), 236-239.
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as being metaphysically uncertain in his initial position.
Yet, tne re is textual evidence that supports us in ignoring
these passages on the grounds that they fail to represent
Descarces' considered opinion.
Both the Meditations and the Principles contain passages
in wh-cn Descartes claims to be metaphysically certain of the
propoi
_ .ion that he thinks and, therefore, exists.^ One
such passage from the Principles is:
w pple thus reject all that of which we can pos-
sibly doubt, and feign that it is false, it is
sasy to suppose that there is no God, nor heaven,
nor bodies, and that we possess neither hands,
r.cr feet
,
nor indeed any body; but we cannot in
the same way conceive that we who doubt these
things are not; for there is a contradiction in
conceiving that what thinks does not, at the same
-ime as it thinks, exist. And hence this con-
clusion I think
,
therefore I am, is the first and
most certain of all that occurs to one who philos-
ophises in an orderly way.^^
Descartes is in his initial position at this point, and he
claims the proposition that he thinks ana, therefore, exists
is the first and most certain conclusion that occurs to him.
This suggests that he believes it is metaphysically certain
for him.
Elsewhere, he traces his metaphysical certainty of this
proposition in his initial position to his direct intuition
of it
.
‘"Haldane and Ross, I, 150> 158 & 221.
lfa Ibid.
,
221.
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* * ’ 51 admi ~t that our intuitions are slightlv
obscured by being mixed up with the body
; but"still the knowledge they give us is primary,
unacquired and certain, and we touch upon themind with more confidence than we give to the
evidence of our eyes. You will surely admitthat you are less assured of the presence ofthe objects you see than of the truth of theproposition: I experience
. therefore I am?
Now, this knowledge is no product of your
-
rea-
soning, no lesson that your masters have taughtyou; it is something that your mind sees, feels,handles;
. .
. it is a proof of the soul's
capacity for receiving from God an intuitive
kind of knowledge . 13
Given Descartes claim to be metaphysically certain in his
initial position of the proposition that he thinks and,
therefore, exists, we may interpret this passage as suggest-
5ng that he regards his direct intuitions as being metaphysic-
ally certain for him at that point.
In replying to the Second Objections Descartes recon-
siders the extent of his metaphysical uncertainty in his
initial position.
Thirdly, when I said that we could know nothing
with certainty unless we were first aware that
God existed
,
I announced in express terms that
I referred only to the science apprehending such
conclusions as can recur in memory without attend -
ing further to the proofs which led me to make
them . Further, knowledge of first principles is
not usually called science by dialecticians. But,
when we become aware that we are thinking beings,
this is a primative act of knowledge derived
from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, 'I_
think
,
hence I am or exist ,
'
does not deduce exis-
tence from thought by a syllogism, but by a simple
11 .hAdam and Tannery, V, 137* This is my translation
of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
160
act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it
were a thing that is known per se.i^
Descartes maintains that in his initial position he is meta-
physically certain of those propositions that are first
principles, when he perceives them in an act of mental vision
by which he knows them per se. He is evidently claiming
that in his initial position he is metaphysically certain
of his direct intuitions. In the Rules he claims he becomes
metaphysically certain of first principles by directly in-
tuiting them, and he describes his direct intuition of such
a proposition as a mental action in which he knows it per
se.!5
On the basis of these three passages, we may justifi-
ably ignore the last four passages cited in the objection.
Since the first passage cited is plausibly interpreted so
that it is in accord with our answer to (1), we need not
worry about it either.
The second objection is also directed against my answer
to (1). On that answer, clear and distinct perception is
characterized as a way of apprehending a proposition that
implies psychological certainty, but does not imply meta-
physical certainty. Yet this way of understanding it is
incorrect. If we understand clear and distinct perception
i ij,
Haldane and Ross, II, 38 •
1
^Ibid
.
,
1 , 8 , 1 6 & 42
.
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in this way, Descartes lacks a plausible defense for his
claim that his clear and distinct perceptions are always
true. It amounts to the claim that whenever he apprehends
a proposition in such a way that it is psychologically cer-
tain for him, it is true, and it is obvious that this is
not the case
.
This objection is based on a misunderstanding. I have
characterized clear and distinct perception in the way just
noted, and I have cited textual support for doing so. But
that characterization is only a partial explanation of
Descartes' concept. I have not claimed that clearly and
distinctly perceiving a proposition is the same as ap-
prehending it in such a way that it is psychologically cer-
tain. There may be much more involved in clearly and dis-
tinctly perceiving a proposition. For this reason, my
characterization does not imply the Descartes' claim that
his clear and distinct perceptions are always true amounts
to the claim that whenever he apprehends a proposition in
such a way that it is psychologically certain for him, it
is true. If there is more to Descartes' concept of clear
and distinct perception, there may be more to his claim.
Once his notion of clear and distinct perception is fully
explained, it may turn out that he has a plausible argument
for his claim.
Furthermore, even if Descartes were to lack such an
argument on my understanding of clear and distinct perception,
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that alone would not show that I had misunderstood that
concept. It would, of course, be agreeable to interpret
clear and distinct perception in such a way that Descartes
has a plausible argument for his claim. Any such inter-
pretation would go far beyond what Descartes himself provides,
however. His own argument is given in this passage.
every clear and distinct perception is withoutdouot something, and hence cannot derive its
origin from what is nought, but must of neces-
sity have God as its author—God, I say, whobeing supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of
any error; and consequently we must consider that
such a conception (or such a judgement) is true.^6
This argumen t is "too obscure to merit serious consideration.
Moreover, the fact that Descartes fails to present a
plausible argument for his claim suggests that his concept
of clear and distinct perception does not provide him with
the makings of one. Hence, a correct interpretation of
that notion might well be one that brings out this defect
in Descartes' position and helps us understand it.
The third objection is directed against my answer to
(2). According to that answer, Descartes formulates a pro-
cedure for deductively intuiting any proposition he clearly
and distinctly perceives. That procedure involves his
deductively intuiting that all his clear and distinct per-
ceptions are true, and directly intuiting that he is clearly
16
Ibid.
, 176.
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and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition. Yet
Descartes denies that he can directly intuit that he is
clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular proposition.
In the Discourse on Method, he writes j
I came to the conclusion that I might assume, as
a general rule, that the things which we conceiveyery clearly and distinctly are true
--remembering,however, that there is some difficulty in ascer-taining which are those that we distinctly con-
ceive. 1 '
In replying to the Seventh Objections
. he states:
This is for the reason that nothing whatsoever
can be clearly and distinctly perceived, who-
ever be the person perceiving it, that it is
not perceived to be such as it is, i.e. which
is not true. But because it is the wise alone
who know how to distinguish rightly between
what is so perceived, and what merely seems or
appears to be clear and distinct, I am not
surprised that our good friend mistakes the
one for the other. 1 ®
In each passage, Descartes claims that it is often difficult
for us to determine whether we are perceiving a particular
proposition clearly and distinctly. He also states that
an individual can be mistaken in his belief that he is doing
so. This suggests Descartes does not regard the proposition
that he is clearly and distinctly perceiving a particular
proposition as an epistemically basic one he can directly
intuit
.
It suffices to note that these paragraphs do not contain
17 Ibid . , 102.
1
8
Ibid
. ,
II, 267.
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>this suggestion. Descartes' claim in them that it is often
difficult for us to determine whether we are clearly and
distinctly perceiving a particular proposition is consistent
with the claim that we can directly intuit the fact that
we are doing so. It only points out that for Descartes it
is often difficult for us to have such a direct intuition.
Having one amounts to clearly and distinctly perceiving that
we are having a particular clear and distinct perception.
According to Descartes, it is not easy to do this. It re-
Quires an expertise in distinguishing the clear from the
obscure and confused . . . .
^
A strong motive for accepting my answer to (2) should
also be noted. The only other plausible way of answering
that question, given my examination of Descartes' epistemology,
is inadequate in the very respect that distinguishes it from
my answer.
This alternative response is the following. Descartes'
task is to trade his initial position for one in which he is
metaphysically certain of any proposition he clearly and
distinctly perceives. He believes that in his initial posi-
tion only two hypotheses cast doubt on a proposition that
is evidenced solely by his clear and distinct perception of
it. These are that God is a deceiver and that his clear and
19 Ibid
. ,
214.
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involving his attaining an epistemic state in which he is
metaphysically certain that he is clearly and distinctly
perceiving his belief. Yet when we understand Descartes'
attempt in this way
,
v/e have what amounts to my answer to
( 2 ).
2 * Even I have successfully answered our questions, I have
only partially examined Descartes' epistemology. I shall,
therefore, note some points that merit further consideration.
Deviously, the notion of clear and distinct perception
needs to be explained more fully. We have seen that Descartes
wants clear and distinct perception to occupy an interesting
place in his epistemology. He wants it to fail to imply
metaphysical certainty, and so be weaker than intuition.
However
,
he also wants it to imply truth and so be stronger
than mere apprehension. Nothing I have said in this dis-
sertation fully explains clear and distinct perception, so
it remains to be seen whether it can be correctly placed
in this position.
Descartes' statement of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for metaphysical uncertainty and his definitions of
direct and deductive intuition also merit further attention.
They imply that his intuitions are always metaphysically
certain. I have not, however, considered what sort of argu-
ment Descartes might give for his criterion of metaphysical
uncertainty. Nor have I considered what factors he might
cite to show that a particular proposition is within the
16 ?
range of his intuition.
These points are of particular interest in connection
with Descartes' claim in the Second Meditation that he is
metaphysically certain of his existence. In some passages,
he argues for that claim on the grounds that he directly
intuits that he exists at that point and that his intuitions
are always metaphysically certain for him. 20 in its present
stage, my interpretation provides a basis for understanding
and evaluating Descartes' position, hut it does not fully
evaluate his argument for the metaphysical certainty of his
intuitions, or indicate how he might defend his claim that
he directly intuits that he exists.
Descartes' approach to his task also needs to be exam-
ined further. At least two questions remain to be considered.
First, is Descartes' procedure for deductively intuiting any
proposition he can clearly and distinctly perceive a success?
I have not evaluated his attempt to deductively intuit
that all his clear and distinct perceptions are true, or his
claim that whenever he clearly and distinctly perceives a
proposition he can directly intuit that he is doing so. Nor
have I considered whether his procedure is brief enough for
him to intuit all its premises at once
.
Second, assuming Descartes successfully completes his
task, what does he gain? Obviously, he finds a way of
2 0
Ibid
.
,
38
.
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becoming metaphysically certain of any proposition he can
clearly and distinctly perceive. However, Descartes does
not fully explain what propositions he can clearly and
distinctly perceive. It is not clear, for example, whether
some very complex scientific truths are beyond the range of
his clear and distinct perception. Nor is it clear whether
he can clearly and distinctly perceive those propositions
that are normally evidenced for him by his senses, such as
the one that he is sitting in front of a fire
.
Furthermore, even if Descartes completes his task
successfully, it is not clear that he thereby gains a way
of coming to know any proposition he can clearly and dis-
tinctly perceive with metaphysical certainty. Nothing in
his notions of intuition and metaphysical certainty seems
to guarantee that whenever a proposition is intuited by
him or is metaphysically certain for him, it is true. For
all I have said about Descartes' epistemology, it may be
that in completing his task he intuits and even becomes
metaphysically certain of some false propositions, includ-
ing the principle that all his clear and distinct perceptions
are true. If this is so, some of his clear and distinct
perceptions are false, and, although Descartes has a way
of becoming metaphysically certain of them, he does not
have a way of coming to know them with metaphysical cer-
tainty. He cannot know a false proposition.
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Even assuming that I have successfully answered my
three questions, a good deal of work remains to be done on
Descartes' epistemology. I hope, however, that in my
answers I have isolated a correct basis from which to do
that work
.
1?0
APPENDIX
Doney's answer to (2) is not open to one objection that
has been made to it in the literature
. Harry Frankfurt claims
that the following statement by Descartes provides textual
evidence against Doney's answer:
But after I have perceived that there is a
God . .
. and from that have concluded that all
those things that I perceive clearuy and dis-
tinctly are necessarily true, then, even if I
attend no further to the reasons for which I
have judged that this was true, just as long
as I recall that I did perceive clearly and
distinctly, no contrary reason can be brought
forward that could drive me to doubt; rather
I have a true and certain knowledge of it. 2
With regard to this passage, Frankfurt states:
Descartes insists, then, that it is sufficient
simply to recollect that God's existence and
veracity have been demonstrated. Accordingly
if the memory thesis is accepted, he is easily
convicted of the blunder of relying upon recol-
lection to provide evidence for the reliability
of recollection. 2
Frankfurt's objection seems to be the following. Doney's in-
terpretation cannot adequately account for this passage.
Descartes claims here that he accomplishes his task by
becoming metaphysically certain that God exists and that
all his clear and distinct perceptions are true. He also
''Adam and Tannery, VII, 170. This is Frankfurt's
translation of the passage in Adam and Tannery.
Frankfurt, Demons
,
160.
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claims that he becomes metaphysically certain of these prop-
ositions on the evidence that he recollects clearly and dis-
tinctly perceiving them. These claims are inconsistent with
the ones that Doney attributes to him. On Doney's inter-
pretation, Descartes maintains that until he accomplishes
his task he cannot be metaphysically certain of any prop-
ositions solely on the basis of his recollection of clearly
and distinctly perceiving them. This commits him to the
position that, contrary to his claim in the above passage,
he cannot accomplish his task by becoming metaphysically
certain of the propositions that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true solely on the
evidence that he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiving
them
.
However, Frankfurt has misread the passage at hand.
Descartes does not claim that he becomes metaphysically
certain of the propositions that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true on the sole
evidence that he recollects clearly and distinctly perceiv-
ing them. Frankfurt is led to interpret this passage in
the way he does because he understands Descartes to be re-
ferring to the propositions that God exists and that all
his clear and distinct perceptions are true when he states,
. .1 have judged this to be true. ..." Yet, when
this passage is read in context, it is clear that Descartes
is not referring to these propositions in that statement.
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Rather, he is referring to the proposition that the angles
of a triangle equal two right angles.
When we consider the translation that Haldane and Ross
give of this passage and of the last half of the paragraph
which precedes it, we find Descartes stating that:
Thus, for
. example
, when I consider the nature of
a rectilinear triangle, I who have some littleknowledge of the principles of geometry recognizequite clearly that the angles of a triangle are
equa- to two right angles, and it is not possiblefor me not to believe this so long as I apply my
mind iO its
. demonstration
; but as soon as I abstainfrom attending to the proof, although I still re-
collect having clearly comprehended it, it may
easily occur that I come to doubt its truth, if
I am ignorant of there being a God. For I can
persuade myself of having been so constructed
by nature that I can easily deceive myself in those
matters which I believe myself to apprehend with
the greatest evidence and certainty, especially
when i recollect that I have frequently judged
matters to be true and certain which other rea-
sons have afterwards impelled me to judge to be
altogether false.
But, after I have recognized that there is a
God because at the same time I have also recognized
that ai- things depend on Him, and that He is not
a deceiver, and from that have inferred that what
I perceive clearly and distinctly cannot fail to
be true--although I no longer pay any attention
to the reasons for which I have judged this [that
the angles of a triangle equal two right angle|
to be true, provided that I recollect having clear-
ly and distinctly perceived it no contrary reason
can be brought forward which could ever cause me
to doubt its truth; and thus I have a true and
certain knowledge of it.
3
The parenthetical remark in the second paragraph has been
added to highlight the line of argument that runs through
3Haldane and Ross, I, 184.
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it from the preceding one. Descartes is contrasting an
epistemic state in which he is not metaphysically certain
of the proposition that the angles of a triangle equal two
right angles with one in which he is metaphysically certain
of it. In the second paragraph, he claims that he can get
from the former state to the latter by establishing that
God exists and that all his clear and distinct perceptions
are true. We have, of course, yet to discover exactly how
we are to understand the difference between these two states
and Descartes ' attempt to get from one to the other. However,
it is evident that the second paragraph does not contain
the claim Frankfurt finds in it.
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